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Two prominent themes resonate in Owen Fiss's considerable body
of scholarship - the importance of an activist state to a democracy and
the role of the judiciary as a significant part of state activism. In several
of his writings,' Fiss justifies the need for an activist state by discussing
and analyzing the democratic value of the First Amendment guarantee of
free speech and the role of the state in furthering these free speech val-
ues. Fiss's argument, however, is not limited to free speech issues, but
is meant instead to illuminate the broader issue of the role of the state in
general. He employs the free speech debate as an important example of
the state's and the judiciary's role in a constitutional democracy.
To Fiss, the Constitution is not a document that "distributes to
future generations pieces of property in the form of rights."2 Instead, it
is a charter of governance that establishes democratic governmental
institutions and sets forth in the Bill of Rights a set of principles and
values that are to control these institutions. Freedom of speech is one of
the most essential rights in a democracy. The adjudicative process is
one of the major methods of transforming these rather abstract ideals,
such as freedom of speech, into concrete rights. The role of the judge is
to give meaning to our public values. Indeed, in Fiss's view, the adjudi-
cative process plays an integral role in determining the quality of our
social existence.
Fiss argues that the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of
speech can be understood in two ways. It can be seen as a limit on state
action. In that sense, it places a value on the autonomy of the citizen.
Autonomy furthers public debate by allowing the individual to say what
he wishes, free from state interference. Autonomy furthers public
© Irwin P. Stotzky and University of Miami Law Review, 2003.
* Professor of Law and Director, Center for the Study of Human Rights, University of
Miami School of Law. I wish to thank Alice E. Meyer for her excellent research assistance. As
this article goes to press, a major crisis has again hit Haiti, forcing the democratically elected
President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, to resign under pressure from the United States and France and
to flee Haiti. I have incorporated some of the recent events into this article.
1. See, e.g., OWEN M. Fiss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH (1996); Owen M. Fiss, The Idea of
Political Freedom, in LOOKING BACK AT LAW'S CENTURY 35 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2002);
Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REv. 1405 (1986); Owen M. Fiss,
Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REv. 781 (1987).
2. Fiss, Why the State?, supra note 1, at 783.
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debate, however, only when power is equally distributed in society so
that all voices have an equal chance to be heard.
Freedom of speech can also be viewed as a means of achieving a
larger political purpose - the production of the "uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open" 3 public debate that is an essential condition for demo-
cratic government. The public debate principle, however, does not cre-
ate a presumption against state interference. As under the autonomy
principle, individuals may say what they wish, free from state interfer-
ence, but unlike the autonomy principle, action is not judged by whether
it interferes with the autonomy of some individual or institution.
Instead, action is now judged by its impact on public debate.
These two views of freedom of speech should work hand-in-hand.
Ensuring the autonomy of the individual should be the means of bring-
ing that public debate into being. It is this linkage between autonomy
and democracy that accounts for the favored position of free speech in
the Constitution as well as the rule against content regulation in First
Amendment jurisprudence. The goal is robust public debate, and auton-
omy is the means to that goal.
In ancient Greece, and perhaps in early America, where the domi-
nant social unit was the individual and power was distributed somewhat
equally, autonomy might well have enhanced public debate and thus
promoted democracy. "But in modem society, characterized by grossly
unequal distributions of power and a limited capacity of people to learn
all that they must to function effectively as citizens, this assumption
appears more problematic."4 The problem is basic. Today, public
debate occurs on national television, radio, the press, and on the Internet.
Effective public debate no longer takes place on street corners or in cof-
fee houses. To participate in this discussion, one must have access to
these national outlets, which are owned by private individuals who
respond to market forces and pay little attention to the democratic needs
of the society. The question then becomes whether the market, even one
that is working perfectly, is the appropriate vehicle to ensure the proper
working of democracy.
Fiss says it is not. He offers several reasons. Because the market
privileges select groups, the opinions of those who have the capital to
own a television station, newspaper, or radio station will almost cer-
tainly be aired. In addition, those groups that determine advertising
budgets and those groups that respond to that advertising certainly will
be favored. These groups might constitute a significant portion of the
electorate, but they are not coextensive with the electorate. In Fiss's
3. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
4. Fiss, Why the State?, supra note 1, at 786.
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view, "[t]o be a consumer, even a sovereign one, is not to be a citizen."5
Moreover, the market also influences the content of the speech. The
newspaper or television station has to remain in business, and so it must
show a profit. This profit consideration will in large part determine
what shows are aired and what stories are printed. A perfectly competi-
tive market will produce stories or shows "whose marginal cost equals
marginal revenue. ' People are more likely to watch reruns of old
sitcoms and not as likely to watch documentaries or public interest
shows. Showing reruns is thus a profitable and efficient use of
resources. In that event, of course, commercial television will provide
reruns of sitcoms. As Fiss makes clear, "there is no necessary, or even
probabilistic, relationship between making a profit (or allocating
resources efficiently) and supplying the electorate with the information
they need to make free and intelligent choices about government policy,
the structure of government, or the nature of society."7
What is needed, Fiss argues, is for the state to act as the corrective
for the market. "The state must put on the agenda issues that are sys-
tematically ignored and slighted and allow us to hear voices and view-
points that would otherwise be silenced or muffled."8 To put it another
way, the state must pass out microphones so that excluded voices may
be heard. Democracy requires it.
As Fiss acknowledges, there are serious problems with this
approach. The state has no monopoly on virtue. There is certainly the
risk that the state might prove self-serving in this regard, selecting only
the views that are consistent with the state's position. Nevertheless, as
Fiss argues, there are significant checks on state power. The private
media almost certainly will attempt to provide an alternative voice. It
well may be, however, that the state is the only institution powerful
enough and thus capable of resisting the pressures of the marketplace.
Another potential problem with Fiss's argument is the danger of
circularity.9 For example, in our constitutional history, one of the major
state functions was to regulate business, but there was good reason to
believe that business actually governed the state. Nevertheless, Fiss
argues that this problem- is overblown. It should be remembered that the
state was the agent for effective social change during the Civil Rights
Movement, and this experience leads Fiss to believe that the "elements
5. Id. at 787.
6. Id. at 788.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD'S POLITICAL -
ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 201-21 (1977).
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of independence possessed by the state are real and substantial."' 10 This
independence may not be complete, but it is nonetheless sufficient to
make the theory of countervailing power viable. The judiciary also has
a role to play in evaluating the intervention of the state to avoid the
problem of circularity. Indeed, Fiss's view relies heavily on the courts
to carry the burden of ensuring rich public debate.
Even though there may be serious problems with Fiss's views, his
approach has one great virtue. The state is accountable to the citizenry;
the market is not. When the state fails to provide the conditions neces-
sary for democracy, the people can vote in new leaders. When the mar-
ket fails, however, there is little or no recourse.
Fiss's view of state activism has a number of implications for
nations attempting to make the transition and consolidation to democ-
racy. My own position is, however, both critical and accepting of Fiss's
views, but not necessarily in the expected manner." Rather than argu-
ing for the necessity of less state activism as most of Fiss's critics
would, I maintain that states, and particularly independent judiciaries in
nations undergoing the transition process, must be substantially more
activist in some areas, particularly in the "economic" sphere, than Fiss
suggests. Indeed, because of the serious economic, political, and social
problems confronting these nations, the only way of progressing from
authoritarianism toward democracy may be through a powerful state
activism.
Nevertheless, in determining the necessary degree of state activism
in nations undergoing the transition process, the state must not be
viewed as monolithic. To put it another way, in each nation, because of
differences in political circumstances, social conflict, economic develop-
10. Fiss, Why the State?, supra note 1, at 791.
11. Robert Post, one of Fiss's most recognized critics, criticizes such "collectivist" political
speech theories for assuming that there is some proper conception of good political discourse
outside of political debate itself. See ROBERT POST, CONSTrruTiONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY,
CoMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT (1995). In several of his writings, Post argues that the primary value
of free speech is to protect autonomy. To Post, autonomy is vital to collective self-determination
because it resolves the conflict between individual and collective autonomy. It binds the
individual to the collective. Without the interplay between collective and individual autonomy,
the individual is alienated from the group, thereby defeating a primary goal of democracy. The
state's function is not to determine who can and cannot be part of the collective autonomy. In
addition, in Post's view, the autonomy theory better explains certain aspects of First Amendment
jurisprudence than the public debate theory. For example, the public debate theory fails to address
adequately the question of commercial speech. Finally, Post argues that Fiss's arguments make
little sense without full acceptance of the autonomy theory. Airing every argument would not, in
fact, enrich public debate, but would confuse it by giving legitimacy to every silly theory. Post
argues that autonomy is the only theory that justifies giving equal opportunity to individuals to
participate in public discourse. This is because by doing so, individuals are treated with equal
respect and are also bound to the collective. See Robert Post, Equality and Autonomy in First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1517 (1997).
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ment and legal culture, the answer to the question of the right degree of
state activism may also be different. Context is crucial.
The literature about democratic transitions, however, tends to lump
all nations together. Part of the problem is a definitional one. The
worldwide democratic revolution of the past three decades is often
described as the transition to (or consolidation of) democracy.' 2 This
terminology, however, conceals a serious ambiguity because it often
refers to two or more distinct situations. The first is a process of adjust-
ments of norms or institutions toward the strictures of the democratic
rule of law. There are, of course, varying stages of conformity. These
stages include different levels of competition among an ideologically
broad spectrum of political parties and differences in the development of
an independent, non-corrupt judiciary that is able to interpret and
enforce a bill of rights. The second describes a situation where liberal
democratic institutions exist in full force, but their stability is not yet
completely secured. In this second situation, prevalent in several
nations, political, social, economic and cultural actions and other mea-
sures are being undertaken to achieve a necessary degree of consensus
and social adhesion to these institutions. Unfortunately, while some of
these actions have helped, others have hindered the success of the
efforts. Moreover, serious problems in all spheres of public and private
life have generally weakened rather than strengthened the consolidation
process.
Latin American democracies are generally in transit to democracy
in the latter sense.' 3 For example, in countries like Argentina and Chile,
full liberal and democratic institutions are in place. The idea that social
tensions and conflicts may coercively interfere with those mechanisms is
not only a distinct possibility but has become an unfortunate reality.' 4
In several nations, Argentina in particular, the current economic crisis
has caused a loss of confidence in all government institutions, including,
of course, in the judiciary and in the rule of law itself. There are other
12. The question of whether nations remain in the transition toward democracy or have
already completed the journey requires conceptual clarification as well as empirical corroboration.
The complex question of when a democracy has been consolidated depends on justificatory
theories of democracy and is intimately connected with the stability of a specific political system.
All of these points raise extremely complicated questions, which depend for their explanations on
the peculiar circumstances of each nation and on certain predictions, particularly about the
stability, development and maturity of institutions. Analyzing these questions requires thorough
research on the institutional structures of particular nations. Broad generalizations, however, can
be made with some degree of certainty.
13. For a discussion of the different characterizations of the process of transition, see
TRANSrrlONS FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE: LATIN AMERICA (Guilermo O'Donnell et al. eds.,
1986); JUAN J. LINz, THE BREAKDOWN OF DEMOCRATIC REGIMES: CRISIS, BREAKDOWN, AND
REEQUILIBRIUM (1978).
14. See discussion infra Part V.
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countries, most dramatically Haiti, where democratic institutions have
yet to develop, even though in the past several years serious attempts
have been made to create, secure, and strengthen them. 5
Whatever stage of democratic development a nation may be in, the
transition to democracy remains a treacherous, difficult journey. In
nations undergoing this transformation, economic, political and social
stability has not yet been fully achieved. The corporatist political and
social structures have not yet been transformed to allow the vast, under-
privileged majority access to basic necessities that ensure a dignified
life.16 Institutional structures of public life, such as a representative leg-
15. As I discuss below, these attempts to democratize Haiti have failed miserably for many
reasons. During President Aristide's first exile, between 1991 and 1994, his administration
drafted an elaborate set of plans to develop an infrastructure and to change the Haitian economic,
political and social structures. The plans called for shifting the social balance of power away from
the executive branch of government to civil society and local government. To do this, the
government attempted to empower several components of civil society, such as political parties,
labor unions, grass-roots organizations, cooperatives and community groups. The government
also tried to create a vibrant private sector with an open foreign-investment policy.
The Aristide government's plan conceives of a sound macroeconomic policy that creates the
proper environment for the private sector as one that eschews "foreign exchange controls, price
controls, and other policy induced distortions." The Aristide Plan holds that the strategy
implemented to realize these goals must:
" meet the basic needs and fully mobilize the human potential of the people of
Haiti;
" demilitarize public life and establish the supremacy of legitimate civilian control
over the military (and now, the former military);
" establish an independent judiciary;
" strengthen the institutional capabilities of Parliament, other autonomous
institutions, and local governments to enable them to play a constructive and
informed role in policy debates and implementation;
" limit the scope of state activity, and concentrate it on the mission of defining the
enabling milieu for private initiative and productive investments;
" reduce the involvement of the central government in the commercial production
of goods and services;
" redefine the relationship and the distribution of political authority between the
central government and local authorities;
" improve the quality of public administration.
HAITI, STRATEGY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION, (1994) (on file with author).
16. In Argentina, this is tragically the case. Only a few years ago, Argentina had a large
middle class and the highest per capita income in Latin America. Today, at least sixty percent of
the population of approximately thirty-seven million live in poverty, which is defined as having an
income of less than $220 a month for a family of four. The number of Argentines living in
poverty has doubled since the end of 2001. Moreover, more than twenty-five percent of the
population is now indigent, defined as having an income of less than $100 a month for a family of
four. See Larry Rohter, Once Secure, Argentines Now Lack Food and Hope, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2,
2003, at A6. As one Argentine has accurately described an increasingly large percentage of the
population:
You see me here digging through the garbage - what else can I say? I have to
choose between feeding my children or clothing them. If they don't have clothes,
they can't go to school. My husband is too old to work now; he's in his 50's. In
this country, once you reach 40 or 50, it's just time to die. And children are
[Vol. 58:201
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islative branch, a competent, independent judiciary, and an executive
branch that strictly adheres to its constitutionally imposed boundaries,
must be developed and stabilized. The rule of law - and thus the fun-
damental guarantees of due process - has to become an accepted, basic
requirement of public life and private social and economic interaction.
All of this is necessary not only to protect human rights and the demo-
cratic process, but also to reach a satisfactory level of economic and
social development. To put it another way, the resolution of each of
these issues is intertwined and dependent on the others, even if they
remain theoretically distinct. Indeed, for democracy to bloom and flour-
ish, they must all be attacked simultaneously and successfully.
Another issue further complicates these already complex problems.
These problems and their possible solutions simply cannot be success-
fully addressed without a justificatory theory of democracy. Such a
democratic vision requires a continuous order of mutually assured and
encouraged autonomy in which political decisions are manifestly based
on the judgments of members of that order, who are, and are recognized
as being, free and equal persons. Moreover, the expression of self-gov-
erning capacities must operate both within the formal institutions of
supposed to stop growing when they're 6 or 7. Today it's impossible to get milk for
a baby! It takes me an hour, but sometimes I walk to the office of social services to
see if they can help me. They never have anything. Now there are going to be
elections. But why should we waste our time and energy to go and cast a vote? To
elect another delinquent to office? There are times when I want to pick up and go,
just pack everything up and leave here. I don't know where to.
Susan Gotthelf, On Barely Getting By in Argentina, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 1, 2002, at 33.
In December 2001, in response to the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) complaint that
the Argentine government failed to impose fiscal austerity and its subsequent drastic action of
cutting off Argentina's credit line, the Argentine government froze bank accounts and defaulted
on its debt. Since then, the economy has shrunk approximately twelve percent, untold numbers of
businesses have closed, and unemployment has risen to close to twenty-five percent. Hunger and
near-starvation have struck particularly hard against the very young and very old, who are, of
course, the most vulnerable. See Larry Rohter, Once Secure, Argentines Now Lack Food and
Hope, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2003, at A6.
With the election of a new president, however, there is hope for better times. For example,
since Argentina's new president, Nestor Kirchner, a Peronist, took office on May 25, 2003,
Argentina and the IMF have agreed to negotiate a new multiyear agreement. Horst Kohler, the
managing director of the IMF, has described Kirchner in positive terms as a leader who has
repeatedly said the growth of the Argentine economy takes precedence over both foreign creditors
as well as the IMF itself. Indeed, Kohler said of President Kirchner, "I do think this vision should
be implemented and that it will lead this country to strong growth and social cohesion." Larry
Rohter, Argentina Agrees to Talk Reform with I.M.F., N.Y. TiMES, June 25, 2003, at AI0. In his
short tenure, Kirchner has challenged every entrenched center of power and privilege in
Argentina. He has attempted to purge the military and national police for corruption or human
rights violations, pressured the chief justice of a corrupt supreme court to resign, attacked
powerful business and labor interests, and attempted to bring the state intelligence apparatus under
control. Even with these actions, problems remain quite serious. See Larry Rohter, Cautiously,
Argentines Wann to the 'K Style,' N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2003, at A16.
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politics and in the affairs of daily life. The democratic order must sat-
isfy the conditions of equal freedom and autonomy that give it
definition.
It is clear that this movement from dictatorship to some form of
democracy has not always run smoothly and that visions of democracy
remain unclear, out of focus. There have been serious internal threats to
fledgling democracies, retrenchments, setbacks and counterrevolutions
leading to new authoritarian regimes, even if sometimes camouflaged as
democracies. What role has and should the judiciary play in this demo-
cratic drama? Can courts, through their very independence, their consti-
tutional adjudicative methods and their role as guardian of the people's
rights, be a positive force in developing and consolidating democracies
and thus a bulwark against a return to authoritarian rule?
In this essay, I argue that democracy cannot be created, consoli-
dated, and perpetuated simply by a heroic judiciary in nations that have
little historical experience with democracy, lack some or much of the
required institutional infrastructure, have few material resources to work
with, and lack the experimental agenda necessary to successfully com-
plete this difficult mission. The barriers to a viable democracy remain
high, particularly because there exists in many of these nations almost
impenetrable cultural, economic, political and social complications rep-
resented by the peculiar history of each nation. In addition, the policies
and actions of the world community, particularly those of the United
States as represented, for example, by the economic policies of the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), have had a
dramatic and often negative impact on these nations. Moreover, the role
of the judiciary, which is extremely important in this transition process,
is also extremely complicated, and it depends crucially on a variety of
factors over which the courts have little control. Nevertheless, in an
activist state the judiciary can play a significant role in several areas,
particularly in protecting the free flow of information to the people so
that they can make informed choices and in checking some forms of
excessive executive actions. Courts may also help create legal doctrines
to liberate and equalize speech opportunities when private corporative
powers monopolize the broadcast and print media. The judiciary can
also play a significant role in helping the state create a transformative
political economy. But judicial independence in several forms, and cer-
tain other judicial characteristics, such as the development of a constitu-
tional adjudicative tradition, are crucial to the successful completion of
this judicial task.
I proceed in the following manner: I begin by analyzing some of
the difficulties nations face in the transition and consolidation process,
[Vol. 58:201
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describe my view of a deliberative democracy that may help alleviate
these almost intractable problems, and look at the judicial role in helping
to secure a democracy, particularly its role in checking the executive and
the private sphere by protecting freedom of speech and freedom of the
press. I also discuss the role of the international community, particularly
the role of the United States, in setting policies for the major interna-
tional trade and monetary organizations, and thus affecting the develop-
ment of these nascent democracies. Finally, I suggest some macro and
micro changes, such as a new vision of a political economy and the
breaking down of cultural barriers, that the judiciary and other state
functionaries also may have a hand in achieving and that may lead to a
more democratic society.17
I.
SOME MAJOR TRANSITIONAL PROBLEMS
There are a number of significant features of the consolidation of
democracies that have taken place in Latin America and Haiti. The first
significant feature of the consolidation is the fact that the process of
democratization has taken place during some of the worst economic,
social and political crises in the history of these nations. To generalize,
these crises include the commission of massive human rights violations,
such as murder, torture and rape. In Argentina, for example, from 1976
to 1983, a series of military juntas ruled the nation. 8 They conducted
what became known as a "dirty war" purportedly against leftist terror-
ism, resulting in the murders of anywhere from 9,000 to 30,000 mostly
innocent people 9 and started and lost a costly war with Great Britain
over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands.2 ° In Haiti, from 1991 to 1994, the
military dictators murdered approximately 5,000 innocent people, bru-
talized, tortured and raped thousands, and terrorized millions of others.2 '
These crises also manifested themselves in enormous external
17. In analyzing all of the issues I raise in this paper, I use Argentina, Chile, and Haiti, to
varying degrees, as the prime examples of my theories.
18. See Paula K. Speck, The Trial of the Argentine Junta: Responsibilities and Realities, 18
U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 491 (1987).
19. The official estimate is 8,960. See NUNCA MAS: INFORME DE LA COMISI6N NACIONAL
SoBRE LA DESPARICION DE PERSONAS [NEVER AGAIN: REPORT OF THE ARGENTINE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON THE DISAPPEARED] 16 (9th ed. 1985); Human Rights in the World: Argentina, 31
REV. INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS 1 (1983) (claiming the number of disappeared to be 15,000 due to
underreporting); JUAN E. CORRADI, THE FITFUL REPUBLIC: ECONOMY, SOCIETY AND POLITICS IN
ARGENTINA 120 (1985) (estimating the number of disappeared to be as high as 30,000).
20. See CORRADI, supra note 19, at 136-45.
21. See IRWIN P. STOTZKY, SILENCING THE GUNS IN HAITI: THE PROMISE OF DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY (1997).
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debts,22 hyperinflation, epidemics, extremely high rates of unemploy-
ment and the collapse of entire systems of social welfare. Initially, there
was hope that these crises would change the economic and social struc-
tures and lead to more efficient schemes of production that would bene-
fit all sectors of society. Instead, it appears that the crises have led to a
new oligopolization that has greatly restricted the powerless sectors of
society from obtaining the goods necessary to live a life of dignity.2 3
Another prominent feature of the consolidation process is a failure
by government and society to fulfill the requirements of the rule of law
in both the formal and informal aspects of public and private life. This
failure originally manifested itself in the concentration of power solely
or primarily in the executive branch of government, leading to massive
human rights abuses and a total disregard for other branches of govern-
ment. It also manifested itself as corruption in public and private eco-
nomic activities, non-observance of efficient economic norms and non-
compliance with the most basic rules of social life, such as elementary
traffic regulations. The failure to follow the rule of law also leads to the
stunting of economic and social development.
The problem is further complicated by the fact that the people of
these nations have failed to internalize the significance of the rule of law
and thus the legitimacy of a constitutional system based upon it.
Instead, the people of these societies manifest a belief in the importance
of status or connections and reject universal standards of achievement
and competition, which are, of course, necessary ingredients of a well-
functioning democracy. The problem runs even deeper, however. The
failure to follow the rule of law by government agents validates the fail-
ure of the people to believe in, live by, and endorse it.24
A final, and even more insidious, obstacle than the other features
nations face in the transition process, when attempting to create, solidify
and consolidate democratic institutions, is the phenomenon of corporat-
ism. Indeed, in some nations, for the transition process to succeed, the
people must dissolve a network of de facto power relationships, which
corporations create and jealously protect by taking advantage of the
power vacuum left by representatives of popular sovereignty. In nations
facing the corporative threat, such as Haiti, where there has never even
22. The Argentine military dictators left the country almost bankrupt with a staggering $45
billion debt. See Peter Passell, The Long Road to Argentina's Financial Disaster, N.Y. TIMES,
June 18, 1989, at A16.
23. Twenty years later, for example, Argentina finds itself in an even worse dilemma. See
Santiago O'Donnell, Argentina May Be Down But ! Don't Plan to Get Out, WASH. POST, Aug. 25,
2002, at BI.
24. This, I think, presents serious collective action problems that adversely affect economic,
political and social development.
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been a hint of a possibility for developing a democratic system of gov-
ernance until very recently, these corporative power relationships have
developed for a variety of historical and cultural reasons. The process is
often transparent. Under the umbrella of authoritarian rule, a number of
social organizations and groups representing particular interests sculpt a
place for themselves after a bargaining process that includes their sup-
port for the present regime. In exchange for this support, these groups
receive varying degrees of economic or political advantage. Such
groups include the military, religious organizations, coalitions of entre-
preneurs, trade unions and sometimes even the so-called independent
press. Once democratic rule is established, of course, these groups stub-
bornly resist relinquishing their power to the representatives of the
people.
The concept of corporatism has been the source of much confusion
and specious theoretical differences.25 The problem arises from two dis-
tinct meanings attributed to the word, one more traditional and the other
more technical. In the more traditional sense, "corporatism" refers to
the control exercised by the state over organizations and interest groups.
A prime example is the control that prevailed in Hitler's Germany. The
more technical meaning, and the one commonly used in the political
arena, describes the supposedly opposite phenomenon: where these
25. For an interesting discussion of the concept of corporatism and its relationship to state and
society in Latin America, see generally AUTHORITARIANISM AND CORPORATISM IN LATIN AMERICA
(James M. Malloy ed., 1977). See also RUTH BERINS COLLIER AND DAVID COLLIER, SHAPING THE
POLITICAL ARENA: CRITICAL JUNCTURES, THE LABOR MOVEMENT, AND REGIME DYNAMICS IN
LATIN AMERICA (1991); HOWARD J. WIARDA, CORPORATISM AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS: THE
OTHER GREAT "ISM" (1997); HOWARD J. WIARDA, CORPORATISM AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
IN LATIN AMERICA (1981); I. Bizberg, Modernisation and Corporatism in Government-Labour
Relations, in MEXICO: THE DILEMMAS OF TRANSITION (N. Harvey ed., 1993); David Collier,
Trajectory of a Concept: "Corporatism" in the Study of Latin American Politics, in LATIN
AMERICA IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 135-62 (Peter H. Smith ed., 1995); M. Victoria Murillo,
Union Politics, Market-Oriented Reforms, and the Reshaping of Argentine Corporatism, in THE
NEW POLITICS OF INEQUALITY IN LATIN AMERICA: RETHINKING PARTICIPATION AND
REPRESENTATION (Douglas Chalmers et al eds., 1997); Ruth Berins Collier & David Collier,
Inducements versus Constraints: Disaggregating 'Corporatism,' 73 AM. POL. Scl. REV. 967-86
(1998); N. CRASKE, CORPORATISM REVISITED: SALINAS AND THE REFORM OF THE POPULAR
SECTOR, (Institute of Latin American Studies, Research Paper No. 37, 1994); Linn A.
Hammergren, Corporatism in Latin American Politics: A Reexamination of the Unique Tradition,
9 COMP. POL. 443-62 (1977); Peter R. Kingstone, Corporatism, Neoliberalism, and the Failed
Revolt of Big Business in Brazil: Lessons from the Case of lEDl, 40 J. INTER-AM. STUD. WORLD.
AFF. 73 (1998); CLAUS OFFE, SOCIETAL PRECONDITIONS OF CORPORATISM AND SOME CURRENT
DILEMMAS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY, (Kellogg Institute, Working Paper No. 14, 1984); TIMOTHY
J. POWER & MAHRUKH DOCTOR, THE RESILIENCE OF CORPORATISM: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN
BRAZILIAN CORPORATIST STRUCTURES, (University of Oxford Centre for Brazilian Studies,
Working Paper No. CBS-29-2002, 2002); Howard J. Wiarda, Toward a Framework for the Study
of Political Change in the Iberic-Latin Tradition: The Corporative Model, 25 WORLD. POL 206-35
(1973).
2003]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
same organizations and interest groups acquire considerable influence
over and exert persistent pressure against government decision makers.
While defining this concept in such an explicit manner tends to place
greater emphasis on one meaning to the exclusion of the other, the term
actually encompasses both meanings when applied to most nations
undergoing the transition process, particularly those in Latin America.
But this is not the whole of the matter. Latin American and Haitian
corporatism does not rise to the level of the fascist institutional structure
of legally sanctioned exclusive organizations or interest groups. Neither
does it reduce itself to the pressure that interest groups apply on political
entities in every pluralistic society; for example, when these groups
lobby for or against legislative acts that may affect them. The Latin
American and Haitian reality is considerably more complex. It includes
variations of both features mentioned above. There is some control by
the state over interest groups and organizations, and there are a variety
of official and unofficial mechanisms that are used to alter their opera-
tion. Simultaneously, however, those organizations exert enormous
pressure on government actors and agencies. This pressure allows the
corporative forces to gain favored treatment of various kinds. Some of
these privileges even amount to a legal monopoly of the interests repre-
sented in a way that approaches the fascist scheme. In many circum-
stances, however, the monopoly power of the corporative interests is
unaccompanied by any significant influence of the state over these inter-
est groups and organizations. In other situations, alternative legal or
even constitutional privileges short of monopoly may be granted that
shield the organization from the raw competitive forces of popular
expression, such as a "free market." In addition, governments may grant
favors in informal ways that in some cases amount to illegal, indeed
corrupt, actions.
Corporatism is, unfortunately, very difficult to overcome. It is an
insidious and powerful force. When the transition process is successful,
and the authoritarian regimes are weakened or abolished and are
replaced by liberal democracies, the corporative groups whose interests
have been favored struggle to retain as many of their privileges as possi-
ble. These entities ferociously compete with the popular sector of soci-
ety, which has recently entered or reentered public life. In many
instances, while the people's entry or reentry overcomes their prior ille-
gitimate exclusion, these very same corporative organizations reclaim
their privileges and deny the people their rightful claims.
Haiti is a particularly striking example of the devastation created by
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corporatism. 26 During the most recent military dictatorship, between
1991 and 1994, the armed forces and their paramilitary civilian front -
the attach6s - assumed total power and influence over all aspects of
life, and completely violated and destroyed any semblance of democratic
practices and institutions. Indeed, the military forces consolidated their
rule by ruthlessly suppressing Haiti's once diverse and vibrant civil soci-
ety - a society that brought the promise of direct participatory democ-
racy to a near reality. Besides killing, torturing and brutalizing
approximately ninety percent of the population, the military systemati-
cally repressed all forms of independent association in an attempt to
deny the Haitian people any organized base for opposition to the brutal
dictatorship. Their goal was to push Haiti back into an atomized and
fearful society reminiscent of the Duvalier era.27 Their strategy was to
make it impossible for Jean-Bertrand Aristide to transform his popular-
ity into the kind of organized support necessary to exert civilian control
over the army or even to create a democratic institutional structure nec-
essary to aid in that endeavor should the international community suc-
ceed in returning Aristide to power. The cost to the Haitian people has
been astronomical. The very civil society that Haiti needs to confront its
desperate economic and social problems has nearly been destroyed.
28
When the international community returned Aristide to power in
1994, his government attempted to restore the armed forces to their
proper constitutional role by prosecuting military officials who were
involved in human rights violations.29 But security is an absolute neces-
sity to pursue this strategy. With approximately 250,000 automatic
weapons cached around the country, however, the goal of diffusing mili-
tary power has been extremely difficult to achieve. A recent incident
illustrates the point. On December 17, 2001, a group of approximately
thirty commandos equipped with sophisticated automatic weapons and
grenade-launching rifles stormed the National Palace and occupied it for
26. For a discussion of Haitian history and culture that analyzes many of the problems of the
transition process, including corporatism, see STOTZKY, supra note 21.
27. Francois ("Papa Doc") Duvalier ruled Haiti with an iron fist between 1957 and his death
in 1971. He reportedly murdered between 40,000 and 60,000 of his fellow Haitians. His son,
"Baby Doc," ruled Haiti from 1971 through 1986. See BERNARD DIEDERICH & AL BURT, PAPA
Doc: HAm AND ITS DICTATOR (1986); JAMES FERGUSON, PAPA Doc, BABY DOC: HAM AND THE
DuvALItRS (1987). See also George DeWan, Reigns of Terror, NEWSDAY, Oct. 26, 1993, at 24.
28. The recent overthrow of the Aristide government, which occurred on February 29, 2004,
was largely caused by the lack of material resources, including people with the necessary
education and training needed to make a democracy work. See Irwin P. Stotzky, Address at
Colloquium: Human Rights & Haiti, sponsored by several departments at Princeton University,
most prominently the Program in Latin American Studies and the Woodrow Wilson School of
Public and International Affairs (Feb. 20, 2004) (on file with author).
29. For a discussion of the moral, legal and political problems associated with prosecuting
human fights violators in these circumstances, see STOTZKY, supra note 21.
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five hours before being routed by Haitian security forces.3 ° Over the
next three years, these former Haitian army members continued their
violent attacks against the Aristide government using these cached
weapons. These attacks were a major cause of the destabilization of the
Aristide government.
Another corporative power, the Catholic Church, has played both
positive and negative roles in the lives of these nations. The Church
hierarchy in Haiti, for example, has for years sided with the military and
the economic elite. During the military rule, the Church hierarchy
exerted great influence over the regulation of matters of private life and
the purity of social customs. For example, while the vast majority of
Haitians are Roman Catholics, almost all Haitians privately practice
Vodoun, the major Haitian folk religion. Publicly, however, the elites
associate Vodoun with evil. Indeed, successive Haitian authoritarian
governments persecuted many individuals who openly practiced the
religion. The persecution has been encouraged and even generated by
the hierarchy of the Catholic Church.
Not surprisingly, the Vatican is the only nation to have recognized
the political legitimacy of the 1991 military coup, and the Church hierar-
chy has consistently opposed Aristide, a former Catholic priest, and any
type of real democratic reform. Local churches, however, have long
helped the people of Haiti by nurturing populist groups in the rural
areas. For example, the Catholic Church has long sponsored literacy
programs for the peasants.
The entrepreneurial sector constitutes another corporative source
directed at the democratically elected government. It seeks to obtain a
variety of privileges and protective measures while preserving those pre-
viously secured. In Haiti, as in other nations, this corporative force has
attempted to boycott many measures designed to achieve progressive
levels of taxation.31 This elite class has ruled Haiti for the 200 years
30. The commandos were former members of the military. At least three people were killed
and several were seriously wounded. See, e.g., Michelle Karshan, Details on the Attempted Coup
D'Etat: Attack on Haiti's National Palace on December 17, 2001, AGENCE HAITIENNE PRESSE,
ASSOCIATED PREss and HAITI PRESS NETWORK, Dec. 2002. These same forces are responsible for
much of the violence leading up to Aristide's overthrow. Indeed, Guy Philippe, one of the so-
called leaders of the violent rebellion, is allegedly the architect of the December 17, 2001, attack
on the National Palace. BBC News, Guy Philippe: The Rebelling Soldier (Mar. 4, 2004), at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/americas/3495944.stm.
31. Indeed, when President Aristide first took office in 1990, he met with representatives of
the elite families, almost all of whom can be classified as members of the entrepreneurial sector,
to discuss the payment of taxes. He told them that one of the most serious problems in Haiti was
the failure of those who earned their fortunes in Haiti to pay taxes. In point of fact, throughout the
history of Haiti, the elites simply refused to pay taxes. Aristide then stated that his government
would not attempt to collect taxes owed in the past, but from this date forward, he expected those
people to pay taxes. The representatives of the elite families essentially told Aristide that he
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since its independence, using the state resources as its personal bank
account and keeping the vast majority of Haitians in a state of extreme
poverty, even slavery.32
Fortunately, positive changes in the corporativist structures of these
nations have taken place. Presently, the armed forces have lost power
and influence in some countries in Latin America and generally have
been more accepting of democratic practices and institutions. In Haiti,
during the first term of Aristide's presidency, the armed forces were
literally dissolved. The former Haitian army became a fifty-person
marching band. Nevertheless, former military officials continued to cre-
ate havoc from 1994 through today. They formed criminal gangs,
mounted military attacks against the National Police Headquarters, Par-
liament and the Presidential Palace, and assassinated several newly
elected senators and approximately eighteen newly trained members of
the National Police Force.33 On December 17, 2001, they even
attempted a coup d'etat by attacking the National Palace.34 Over the
next several years, they continued to commit violent acts to destabilize
the Aristide government.3 Finally, on February 29, 2004, they suc-
would not be in office long enough to collect taxes. Approximately three weeks after that
meeting, Aristide was overthrown by a military coup. Interviews with Jean-Bertrand Aristide, in
Port-au-Prince, Haiti, (Nov. 8, 1993 to Dec. 1997). Under Rend Preval's government, which
served from 1996 through 2001, taxes on the elites and the middle class were slowly beginning to
be collected. For example, those who import automobiles are now sometimes required to pay the
import tariffs. Nevertheless, tax collection remains sporadic and inconsistent. Corruption of
public officials is a continuing problem.
32. Ironically, Haiti is the product of a revolution against slavery and colonialism. It emerged
as a nation in 1804, after a thirteen-year struggle against France that resulted in the destruction of
the French colony of Saint Dominique. Almost immediately after independence, the Haitian elites
attempted to recreate the plantation economy, treating the rural masses in much the same way the
French colonial oppressors had treated them. The former slaves, however, simply refused to
return to a state of slavery. Instead, they settled as small peasants on land that they had bought or
reconquered from the state, or that had been abandoned by large landowners. The urban elites
then devised a dual strategy to counter this situation.
The first part of the plan was economic. The elites used the fiscal and marketing systems of
the country to create wealth-producing mechanisms for themselves. They became traders,
politicians and state employees. They prospered by living off the peasants' labor. Taxes collected
by the import-export bourgeoisie at the urban markets and customhouses - paid solely by the
peasants - provided the entire source of government revenues. The elites then took over the state
and used the state revenues as their personal bank accounts.
The second part of the plan was political. The strategy was to isolate the peasants on small
mountain plots and keep them away from politics. It was a brilliant but corrupt strategy. The
peasants, who unknowingly subsidized the elites, had no say whatsoever in how the state was to
be run. For analysis of these points, see STOTZKY, supra note 21; see generally, MICHEL-ROLPH
TROUILLOT, HAM, STATE AGAINST NATION: THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF DUVALIERISM (1990).
33. See STOTZKY, supra note 21.
34. The coup d'etat attempt proved unsuccessful. See Karshan, supra note 30. It was simply
a precursor to the more successful 2004 coup d'etat that followed.
35. Many of these acts took place in the rural areas of Haiti, resulting in the murders of at
least 25 people. These murders were committed by armed commandos identifying themselves as
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ceeded in overthrowing the democratically elected government.
In several nations, the Catholic Church is reluctantly ceding its
claim that the state should enforce the Church's vision of private, per-
sonal life. In other nations, however, the Church refuses to occupy a
more limited public role. In addition, in many of these nations, the
influence of trade unions has been hobbled by unemployment and by the
decline of the welfare state - a decline that sometimes alienates and
harms those normally aligned with the government.
The great enigma, which is directly related to the economic and
social crisis, is whether the previously dominant economic groups have
retained their power, or even increased it, by exchanging their positions
as privileged contractors of the state for positions as owners and thus
monopolistic providers of the recently privatized public services. In
Haiti, the question has a rather unusual twist: whether the previously
dominant entrepreneurial groups remain powerful or have been reduced
to puppets of the military during the dictatorship, and, if they now retain
power during the transition period, whether they will reassert it or yield
some of it to the people. During most of Haiti's history, the military did
the bidding of the elite classes by protecting their economic monopolies
and brutally suppressing the vast majority of the poor. In turn, the rich
paid off the dictators.
During the 1991-94 coup period, however, circumstances changed
dramatically. The military took over the country's ports and landing
strips, thus enabling its high-ranking officers to prosper in the illicit drug
trade. More important, the military increasingly prospered through its
control of state monopolies. Alarm over these incursions into the econ-
omy led the economic elite to support, however tentatively, the return of
Aristide to office. The question remains, however, what role the eco-
nomic elite will play now that the 1991-94 military dictatorship is over,
two successive democratic governments have come to power and the
second Aristide administration has been removed.
It is clear from this brief discussion of corporatism that one of the
main obstacles facing a nation undergoing the transition to democracy is
the interpenetration of corporative power relations, which are remnants
of previous populist and authoritarian stages. The corporative actors,
however, do not necessarily play the same role in each nation. For
former soldiers of the disbanded Haitian army. On May 6, 2003, for example, a group of up to
twenty armed men reportedly attacked the Peligre hydroelectric dam in the lower Central Plateau,
the country's largest power source. Two civilian security agents were killed. The attackers
escaped and reportedly stole a hospital vehicle and identified themselves as former FADH (the
Haitian army) soldiers. Press Release, Amnesty International, Haiti: Abuse of Human Rights:




example, the Catholic Church does not function in Haiti as it does in
Argentina, and trade unions hold different positions in Haiti than in Bra-
zil. But the script is nevertheless repeated in each country because the
formal creation or reestablishment of democratic rule is simply not suffi-
cient to destroy the corporative power relationships built up during the
dictatorship periods. The corporations try to preserve their power rela-
tions and privileges through the transition, generating different types of
crises, such as a military or economic threat, which exert tremendous
pressure on the fragile democratic system 6.3  Democratic-minded gov-
ernments appear unable to deal effectively with this phenomenon.
Indeed, these citadels of power are insidious.
II.
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
The best means for countering this corporative power is to create a
polity governed by universal and impersonal principles where individual
citizens, who are not permanently identified with any particular set of
interests but preserve the capacity to adopt different ones, make choices
through a process of public justification and dialogue. In practical
terms, this requires broad popular participation in governmental deci-
sion-making and its consequent actions, led by strong participative and
ideologically committed political parties and parliamentary bodies.
These parties and parliaments must themselves, of course, be internally
democratic, open and disciplined.
These conclusions are based on a particular vision of democracy
that demands the utmost respect for the autonomy of each individual. In
this view, autonomy consists of the exercise of self-governing capaci-
ties, such as the capacities of understanding, imagining, reasoning, valu-
ing and desiring. Free persons have, and are recognized as having, such
capacities. In a political order dedicated to serving the conditions of free
deliberation for its members, those members can legitimately expect that
order not only to permit, but also to encourage the exercise of such
capacities - that it permit and encourage autonomy. Indeed, one of the
hallmarks of liberal democracy is the notion of the citizen, who is not
identified with any particular interest, but who is free to choose among
competing interests and has an equal voice in expressing his choice.
This ideal of the autonomous individual as a paradigm for democ-
racy rejects the view that democracy is simply a conglomeration of
interested individuals and groups working in conjunction with the econ-
36. This is exactly what has been occurring in Haiti for the past several years. See Irwin P.
Stotzky, Democracy and International Military Intervention, in DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
IN LATIN AMERICA 125 (Richard S. Hillman et al. eds., 2002).
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omy or merely a mechanism for replacing elites. I" and many others,
most prominently Carlos S. Nino,38 have elsewhere attempted to explain
democracy as a regimented mode of the practice of moral discourse by
which we try to solve conflicts in the light of universal, general and
public principles that would be accepted in ideal conditions of impartial-
ity, rationality and knowledge. This, the argument goes, makes democ-
racy morally superior to other systems of government. Democracy
substitutes simple majoritarian decision for the requirement of a unani-
mous consensus in the common and non-regimented practice of moral
discourse. But this is not completely sufficient. This substitution weak-
ens the force of the prescription that the result of the procedure is mor-
ally valid because it would be accepted under ideal conditions (given the
functional equivalence between unanimity and impartiality). Neverthe-
less, democracy preserves some epistemological value because the need
to justify one's decision to others in order to gain their support generates
a tendency toward impartiality. This impartiality, in turn, makes it more
reliable than other decision processes, such as individual reflection.
This epistemic view of democracy presupposes that individuals,
who are basically moral persons, are its natural agents and that the free-
dom and equality of their intervention in the democratic process should
be preserved and expanded. This is not the case when corporations con-
trol the polity and assume the role of intermediaries. Moreover, this
conception of democracy as a substitute for moral discourse presupposes
that the primary objects of decision in the democratic process are not
crude interests but principles that legitimize a certain balance of interests
from an impartial point of view. While it is possible that discourse may
have its genesis in crude interests, for those interests to garner majority
agreement, advocates must win support and justify their positions.
Thus, the dialogue requires participants to reach for principles beyond
their crude interests. They must reach for principles from an impartial
point of view. In addition, dialogue respects and fosters autonomy.
Again, this is not the case when corporations control the polity and
assume the role of intermediaries. It follows, therefore, that corpora-
tions, which agglutinate people around common interests and not around
moral views about how to deal with common interests, cannot be the
protagonists of the democratic process.
Corporative entities in transitional societies maintain and even
37. See SToTZKY, supra note 21; Irwin P. Stotzky, Creating the Conditions for Democracy, in
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Harold Hongju Koh & Ronald C. Slye eds.,
1999); Irwin P. Stotzky, Establishing Deliberative Democracy: Moving from Misery to Poverty
with Dignity, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. J. (1998) (the 1998 Ben J. Altheimer Lecture).
38. See, e.g., CARLOS S. NINO, ETiCA Y DERECHOS HUMANOS (1984). Nino was the main
proponent of this epistemic view of democracy.
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increase their power whenever democracy departs substantially from the
strictures of the original practice of moral discourse. When this occurs,
public debate becomes restricted and debased, the power of participants
actually to influence people becomes grossly unequal, and the participa-
tion of interested people becomes narrower and weaker. Thus, in order
to strengthen the democratic power of common citizens against that of
corporations, it is crucial to broaden and deepen popular participation in
political discussion and decision-making.
Furthermore, the mechanisms of representation, necessary in large
and complex societies, are prone to be subverted by corporative power.
This subversion can be caused by several factors. There is the possibil-
ity of corruption of the individual representatives, their indifference or
even antipathy toward the people they represent when corporations
oppose the people's positions, and the apathy of the people represented.
For these reasons, it is essential to widen the ways of direct participation
by the people whose interests are at issue. This is, of course, a difficult
task. Nevertheless, it is possible to do this through general procedures
like referenda, popular consultation or through decentralized decisions
that allow the concerned people to participate directly.39
Moreover, the vision of democracy as a regimented modality of
discussion of moral principles to regulate conflicts allows us to qualify
the liberal rejection of any intermediary between the individual and the
state. Indeed, in a large, complex society, some institutions must protect
the individual against the awesome power of corporatism. The most
likely candidates are political parties, but only when those parties are the
standard for or represent the basis of fundamental principles of political
morality. They are indispensable in a modem and large society, not only
because they nurture those principles in professional politicians who
purport to put them into practice if duly elected, but also because they
exempt individuals from justifying their votes before each other on the
basis of principles. In this view, it is sufficient to vote for a party that
organizes its programs on the basis of public, general and impartial
principles.
The deterioration of the role of political parties in favor of corpora-
tions occurs when the importance of parliament, the national arena for
these parties, is severely eroded. Unfortunately, the integrity of parlia-
ment is often diminished by corporative forces in the transition and con-
solidation processes. Corporations prefer to exert pressures and achieve
agreements in the private offices of the administration rather than in the
noisy, pluralistic, and more public parliamentary corridors. In addition,
39. Courts, of course, may play a central role here.
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administrations tend to preserve some of the practices inherited from
previous authoritarian governments.
Strengthening political parties and the parliamentary institutions in
order to protect the democratic system against corporative power, how-
ever, will work only to the extent that these institutions do not become
transformed into corporations themselves. Unfortunately, this corpora-
tive transformation occurs often, particularly when parties weaken their
ideological commitment, fail to promote debates on essential questions
of public morality, block channels of participation, operate through
methods of patronage and clientelism, or resort to personalism and
caudillism. If this happens, these parties and parliaments tend to
develop elites with distinctive interests who are likely to become aligned
with members of traditional corporative groups in a manner inimical to
democratic principles. This also causes other dangerous distortions.
When parties become corporations, parliament becomes weakened by
the lack of diverse views held by different representatives, by a dis-
course that is both ideologically vacuous and detached from the exper-
iences and interests of the people represented, and by a general
appearance of opacity and self-service.
To alleviate or even avoid this danger, political parties and parlia-
ment must be fortified. This can be achieved by opening the parties to
broad popular participation, promoting permanent political debates
within them, perfecting internal democratic mechanisms for selecting
party leaders and candidates, and giving a public accounting of the rea-
sons for significant actions, such as how funds are to be managed. It is
also important that the electoral system combine the need for promoting
party cohesion and ideological identity with the need for the voter to
identify with individual representatives, rather than simply voting for the
party slate. A mixed electoral system incorporating proportional repre-
sentation with individual candidate selection may satisfy both needs.
This concept can be extended to parliamentary procedures, which should
combine party discipline with a degree of autonomy for individual
representatives.
III.
COURTS, DEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS
From this discussion, it is clear that courts have an important, if
somewhat limited, role to play in checking the executive and helping to
stabilize and consolidate institutional structures that champion individ-
ual participation and democracy. Again, however, that role depends on
particular visions and versions of democracy and on particular aspects of
each nation. Nevertheless, some generalizations do make sense.
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As I have argued, these nations are in varying stages of democratic
development. Thus, to understand the role of the judiciary, it is crucially
important to determine the basic characteristics of democracy. A pre-
liminary definition and discussion of democracy, therefore, makes some
sense.
Democracy is an exercise - and an experiment - in collective
self-governance in which the sovereign power resides in the people as a
whole and is exercised either directly by them4° or by their representa-
tives - usually officials elected by them. In modem societies, of
course, elected officials generally exercise this power in the name of the
people. That means, among other things, that the state must be respon-
sive to the needs, desires and interests of those people.
Democratic theory is based on a notion of human dignity. The
argument is that as beings by nature worthy of respect, adults must enjoy
a very large degree of autonomy, a status largely derived in the modern
world by people being able to share in the governance of their own com-
munity. Because direct rule is unfeasible for a large mass of people,
most can share in the process of self-governance only by delegating
authority to freely chosen representatives.
There is, of course, much more to democracy than the holding of
periodic elections and representative government. A real democracy
often more vaguely denotes a social state in which all of the people have
equal rights without heredity or arbitrary differences of social rank or
privilege. The social and economic conditions supporting a viable rep-
resentative democracy are extremely complex, but only a few formal
institutional conditions are necessary to categorize a state as democratic.
These minimal institutional requirements include the popular election of
representatives, by universal suffrage in districts of approximately equal
population for limited terms to institutions that allow those representa-
tives to govern, free entry of citizens for candidacy to electoral office,
and freedom of the press, expression, communication and association so
that the people can be informed and can try to persuade others to join
them. These conditions and institutional arrangements, in turn, require a
multitude of ancillary rights.4 ' Together, they create an open market of
political ideas to allow the people to choose candidates and form groups
to express common interests.
Moreover, for democratic theory, what makes governmental deci-
sions morally binding is the democratic process, where the people freely
40. Modem examples are hard to find. The best examples are the small republics of antiquity,
such as ancient Athens.
41. What those fights may be requires an analysis of theoretical issues of the most
complicated kind.
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select representatives who debate and enact policies and who later stand
for reelection, and where administrators enforce that policy. A coherent
theory of representative government does not necessarily claim that citi-
zens possess equal capacity to understand the issues or the suggested
policies or options. It does require, however, a belief that most adults
can recognize their own self-interest, join with others who share those
interests, and choose among candidates and policies. This suggests an
optimistic belief that citizens, if given the opportunity, can and will
develop the skills, arts and habits needed for a life of responsible delib-
eration and decision-making.
The chief check against tyranny in democratic theory is the strongly
held belief that the people will not deliberately tyrannize themselves.
Instead, the theory suggests that they will attempt to select officials who
will not enact oppressive laws and that they will vote out of office those
who do. Popular participation is esteemed not only for its positive effect
of expressing individual autonomy but also for its negative effect of
stopping governmental incursions into individual rights.
Some democratic theorists claim a second check against tyranny in
a democracy stems from the way democratic politics operates in modem
large and diverse nations. Because the majority of the people have little
concern for most political issues, the argument goes, there is generally a
low level of involvement in politics. This allows coalitions of minorities
to form temporary alliances and to trade support among themselves on
different issues. Moreover, since political cleavages are rarely cumula-
tive, a particular interest group is not likely to be permanently allied
with one set of groups against a second permanent coalition.
Democratic theorists do not claim that these checks on authority
always protect the citizens' liberty or even prevent public officials from
acting independently to create public policy. Rather, they argue that
such checks force public officials to mediate among competing interests.
Officials will be wary of oppressing any group for fear it will become
part of a future winning coalition. Democracy may even force people,
on a moral level, to respect competing interests as a form of justice.
Finally, there is another limitation. A valid law cannot simply
reflect prejudice against minorities by placing burdens principally or
solely on them. This limiting principle flows from the premises that the
people as a whole are sovereign and that majority rule is no more than a
decision-making arrangement. This principle leads to complex ques-
tions of how to determine when a particular law makes valid distinctions
and when it unconstitutionally (invidiously) discriminates against a
group of people, and who can legitimately make this determination - the
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people, their elected representatives, or the judiciary, usually non-
elected officials.
A slightly thicker version of democracy than the bare-bones institu-
tional arrangements I suggest above requires an environment of personal
security for people to pursue their desires and their professions, to move
about freely, and to explore new ideas and modes of living. An even
thicker version of democracy means, among other things, the building of
vibrant institutions of justice and law and the full blooming of civil soci-
ety. A truly vibrant democracy suggests an opportunity and an ability
for the people to create and participate in a broad range of political par-
ties, an engaged and highly competent and independent media, indepen-
dent labor unions, and nongovernmental organizations such as women's
groups, all of which encourage political and social participation.42
In exercising the sovereign prerogative of self-governance in mod-
em societies, the people necessarily depend on certain institutions to
evaluate government policies and to provide information and analysis
about the positions of politicians competing for office. Today, the
organized press, particularly the broadcast media, is the major institution
that performs this informative and evaluative function in democratic
nations. To perform this democratic function, however, the press must
be protected both from the state and from private threats. To put it
another way, the press needs a large degree of independence from the
state, but also needs help from it. Although most proponents of free
speech would deny or indeed find certain aspects of this view dangerous,
even deplorable, the state can be both an enduring friend and an enemy
of the press. This is especially true in developing democracies.
The view that real freedom of speech may mean that the state has to
interfere to liberate and equalize speech opportunities is premised on a
democratic theory of free speech, one that emphasizes social, rather than
individualistic values.43 Under this theory, free speech is intended to
42. There is even more complexity. The concept of constitutionalism and its relationship to
democracy adds another wrinkle to judicial decision-making. See, e.g., CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO,
THE CONsTrrrIrlON OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (1996); Stanley N. Katz, Constitutionalism and
Civil Society, The Jefferson Lecture, University of California at Berkeley (Apr. 25, 2000)
(unpublished manuscript on file with author).
43. The alternative view sees freedom of speech as the necessary context of any meaningful
concept of liberty, not in an instrumental sense, but in a constitutive sense that a society of
silenced but "otherwise free" persons is unthinkable outside a religious retreat. Freedom of
speech is seen as a constitutive part of personal autonomy and as a basis for self-expression and
self-fulfillment. This view makes its appeal to the individualistic ethos of modem society that is
inherent in modem popular and political culture. Another model of free speech, prevalent in the
United States, is the "marketplace of ideas" paradigm. Proponents of this model claim that truth
or the most illuminating perspective or solution can be discovered through the process of debate,
free from any kind of governmental interference. See John Milton, Areopagitica, in
AREOPAGrrICA AND OTHER PROSE, WRITINGS BY JOHN MILTON (W. Hailer ed., 1927).
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broaden the terms of discussion so that the people become aware of the
issues before them and of the most compelling arguments on all sides.
The state has the burden of ensuring and nurturing a public freedom. In
theory, this will allow all citizens to pursue their goals fully, freely, and
perhaps even to make the morally correct decisions.
Democracy, as a system in which the majoritarian opinion is val-
idly binding insofar as all of the people concerned have participated in
both the discussion and in a collective decision, is the natural substitute
for the mechanism of informal discussion and unanimous consensus.
This system allows for the adoption of new decisions at particular times.
If this does not occur, the status quo will prevail, even if it is favored by
only a minority. Majority rule is not the functional equivalent of impar-
tiality: The majority may be openly biased against a minority. Neverthe-
less, when all people concerned freely and equally participate in the
process of deliberation and decision, democracy preserves some of the
epistemic value inherent in the process of informal discussion and unani-
mous consensus. Democracy, based on this process, includes a dynamic
of collective action and tends toward the adoption of impartial solutions.
This does not mean that democratic solutions are always correct; it
means only that they are generally more likely to be right than solutions
adopted by any other procedure. To put it another way, the democratic
method of collective decision-making is more reliable than the proce-
dure of isolated individual reflection in reaching morally correct solu-
tions to intersubjective moral issues. For example, dictators have acted
on the basis of their own reflections on intersubjective moral matters and
have had the power to enforce their decisions. The results of this pro-
cess have, of course, been disastrous. In addition, however wise and
well-meaning an individual may be, it is unlikely that he could represent
the real interests of others better than they could themselves by directly
participating in the process of discussion and decision.
The epistemic value of democracy varies with the degree to which
its underlying conditions are satisfied. Those conditions depend on the
openness of the debate and the degree to which people equally partici-
pate in, and support, the final decision. There is, of course, a threshold
at the lowest degree of satisfaction of those conditions below which the
epistemic value of the process is so feeble that it begins to be surpassed
by the value of the process of individual reflection.
Reliable and objective information about the relevant issues is a
critical factor in the validity of such a democratic process in the manner
I have suggested. Indeed, in my view, democracy is a system that
allows the people the freedom to choose the form of life they wish to
live. As Owen Fiss argues, democracy presupposes that this choice is
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made against a background of public debate that is, to use the phrase
Justice Brennan made famous, "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.""'4
Freedom of speech and freedom of the press thus play a very crucial role
in a democracy. Such freedom is "the matrix, the indispensable condi-
tion of nearly every other form of freedom"4 5 and indeed of the demo-
cratic process itself. This is where the judicial role is perhaps most
significant in a democracy. The courts must foster, protect and
encourage freedom of speech and freedom of the press, in the broadest
sense, to help inform the people. Therefore, Fiss's view of an activist
state makes immense sense here.
To perform its democratic functions, the press needs to be com-
pletely independent from the state in several ways. One of the major
forms of independence is strictly economic. The print media (newspa-
pers and magazines) and the broadcast media (radio and television) must
be privately owned. If the press is economically dependent on the state,
the information available to the people could be limited only to the
state's views. State officials would be able to hire or fire journalists or
broadcasters who did not report the news in line with the state's views
and to replace them with their own people who would necessarily follow
the "party line." The judiciary must exercise its power to keep the state
from making the press economically dependent on it and from punishing
the press by imposing severe taxes on it. This is, however, an extremely
difficult task and may even be an unconstitutional task in some nations.
Nevertheless, it is an important judicial function if democracy is to
develop and be secured.
A second and related form of independence from the state is almost
exclusively "legal." Legislation must be enacted, and judicial doctrines
must be developed, to limit the state's capacity to silence government
critics through criminal or civil actions.46 Seditious libel cannot exist as
44. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
45. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937). There are several senses in which this is
true. First, this freedom is clearly essential to self-government, through which real freedom is
defined, realized and secured. Second, it is vital to publicize, and hence root out, violations of
other rights against the majority. If a society does not allow a vigorous and real freedom of
speech and press, the government could simply silence those whose rights it invaded. Finally,
such freedom is the necessary context for any meaningful concept of liberty.
46. The media can be not only irresponsible but also quite dangerous. In Rwanda, for
example, three Rwandan news media executives are on trial on charges of genocide and
incitement to genocide through their use of radio broadcasts and newspapers. The defendants are
accused of using their media outlets to spread ethnic hatred, to demonize the Tutsi and to persuade
people to kill the Tutsi and moderate Hutu. Their trial is examining the issue of the role of the
news media in the massacre of more than 800,000 people in Rwanda in 1994.
The case is the first of its kind since 1946, when a Nazi publisher of an anti-Semitic weekly
(Der Starner) appeared before the Nuremberg tribunal. At that time, the charge of genocide did
not yet exist. Nevertheless, the Nazi publisher was sentenced to death. The Rwandan trial is
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a valid legal doctrine in a democracy. The press and other government
critics cannot be prosecuted for libeling the state. In addition, defama-
tion actions by public officials for criticisms leveled against perform-
ance of their public duties must be severally restricted. Even these
minimal requirements are not easy to develop. Indeed, in the United
States, where freedom of speech is said to reign supreme, the Supreme
Court did not officially declare the crime of seditious libel to be uncon-
stitutional nor severely limit defamation actions by public officials
against critics of their public performance until 1964. 4"
The concept of seditious libel strikes at the very heart of democ-
racy. Political freedoms end when government, particularly the execu-
tive, can use its power and its courts to silence its critics. The
supporting argument is not the mild one that there must be some leeway
for criticism of the government. The argument is rather that defamation
of the government is a completely incompatible, indeed impossible,
notion for a democracy. The presence or absence in the law of the con-
cept of seditious libel determines and defines a democratic society. A
society may or may not treat such concepts as obscenity or contempt by
publication as legal offenses without necessarily harming its democratic
nature. If it makes seditious libel a crime, however, it is simply not a
free society, no matter what its other characteristics. Thus, one of the
most crucial judicial functions - perhaps one of its major democratic
functions - is to strike down seditious libel laws as being violations of
democratic rule.
Another form of independence, one that requires positive state
action, is the physical integrity of governmental critics. Reporters and
publishers must be protected from physical violence. Unfortunately, this
continues to be a serious problem in developing democracies. Between
1992 and 2001, for example, 389 journalists were killed in the line of
duty, and almost all of them were murdered in direct reprisal for their
reporting.48 "Of the 389 journalists killed on the job, only 62, or 16
percent, died in cross fire during an assignment, while 298, or 77 per-
cent, were targeted for their work."4 9 There is more bad news. In
ninety-five percent of the cases, those who kill journalists do so with
expected to set international standards for the limits of free speech. It certainly will raise the issue
of whether journalists should exercise self-restraint or even self-censorship during periods of
severe crises. See Marlise Simons, Trial Centers on Role of Press During Rwanda Massacre,
N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 3, 2002, at A3.
47. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 292.
48. Press Release, Committee to Protect Journalists, Journalism's Terrible Toll: CPJ Releases





impunity. 0 But the problem is even more complicated than it first
appears. Much of the violence propagated against governmental critics
is either overtly or covertly sponsored by the state. Nevertheless, pres-
sure from the United States, its allies, the international community, the
United Nations, the Organization of American States and international
human rights institutions may be helpful in reducing the violence and in
deterring future threats. The judiciary must use its investigative powers
to solve these human rights crimes. Courts are the institutions charged
with protecting the democratic role of the press, and such international
pressure may help them carry out this duty.
One other serious problem with private ownership of the press is
the impact that private aggregations of power have on the performance
of the press's democratic function. While it is vital to have a privately
owned communications industry, it is equally important to recognize
that the industry is constrained by its own economic structure. As Fiss
makes clear, media owners operate commercial ventures and seek to
maximize their profits and to minimize their costs and losses.5 Indeed,
their decisions on what news to report and how to report it are almost
exclusively determined by their wish to make a profit and thus to avoid a
loss. The quest for profits may cause the press to avoid vigorous and
effective criticism of government officials, their public actions, the posi-
tions and actions of candidates for office, and private corporative inter-
ests because airing such reports would harm its own economic interests.
For example, particular government policies may increase the profits of
the press but may have negative effects for the majority of citizens or for
particular groups of citizens.
Part of the problem of media inadequacy in providing accurate,
important, democratically required information to the public is caused
by what has become popularly known as the "media monopoly." This is
not only a problem in developing democracies but also in well-devel-
oped democracies. Indeed, it is a striking, dangerous phenomenon in the
United States. For example, many people are surprised to discover that
while at the end of World War II, eighty percent of the daily newspapers
in the United States were independently owned, by 1989 that number
was reversed, with eighty percent owned by corporate chains.52 With
each passing year, the number of controlling firms has shrunk. For
example, by 1984 some fifty corporations controlled most of the media
outlets in the United States, but by 1993, the number of corporations
50. Id.
51. See Fiss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 1, at 52; Fiss, Why the State?, supra
note 1.
52. BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY 4 (5th ed. 1997).
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controlling those outlets had dropped to less than twenty.53 In 1996, the
number of media corporations with dominant power in society was
closer to ten. 4 In 2002, with the recent merger of Time Warner Com-
munications and America Online, the number is even smaller.55
Because of government deregulation in the early 1980s and industry
consolidation in the 1990s, these ever-dwindling numbers of big media
owners are setting the agenda and regulating political and social dis-
course in the United States.56 In addition, there are many cities in the
United States without a major newspaper or with only one major news-
paper, and the three major networks hold a privileged position in captur-
ing viewers. In other nations, the monopoly power of certain
corporative forces is even more pronounced.5 7  Again, as Fiss's work
makes clear, there is a gap between market-determined speech and dem-
53. Id. at xxiii.
54. Id.
55. The trend to increase the power of fewer corporations to control more of America's local
press, television, and radio, may finally be meeting some resistance. In May 2003, the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), over the protests of 750,000 viewers and readers, voted to
concentrate the power to decide what the citizens hear, see, and read, in both hard news and
entertainment, in the hands of an ever-shrinking media elite. See Stephen Labaton, A Media Rule
By the F.C.C. Is in Jeopardy in the House, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2003, at Cl; William Safire,
Localism's Last Stand, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2003, at A27; William Safire, Big Media's Silence,
N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2003, at A3 1. In the name of "foster[ing] a vibrant marketplace of ideas",
the FCC vote would now permit a television network to own stations that collectively reach forty-
five percent of the national audience - up from thirty-five percent - and also would permit cross-
ownership of newspapers, television and radio stations. Press Release, Federal Communications
Commission, FCC Sets Limits on Media Concentration (June 2, 2003), available at http://www.
fcc.gov. However, on September 3, 2003, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
in Philadelphia issued a surprise injunction blocking the FCC from imposing the new rules.
Prometheus Radio Project v. Federal Communications Commission, No. 03-3388, 2003 WL
22052896 (3d Cir., Sept. 3, 2003). Andrew Jay Schwartzman, the attorney who argued for the
injunction, said, "This decision is bad for democracy, and bad for broadcast journalism." Stephen
Labaton, U.S. Court Blocks Plan to Ease Rule on Media Owners, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 4, 2003, at
Al. The following day, a Senate committee unanimously approved a spending measure with a
provision that would block the proposed ownership rules. The lopsided vote made it likely that
the measure would be approved by the full Senate. Stephen Labaton, Senate Panel Acts to Block
TV Ownership rule, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 5, 2003, at C1. Finally, on September 16, 2003, by a vote
of 55 to 40, the United States Senate approved a resolution to repeal all proposed regulations. The
vote was only the second time in history that the Senate had used a parliamentary procedure
known as a resolution of disapproval to veto an action by a regulator. Stephen Labaton, F.C.C.
Plan to Ease Curbs on Big Media Hits Senate Snag, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2003, at Al.
56. See generally BAGDIKIAN, supra note 52, chs. 1-3, 13.
57. I believe, however, that this way of analyzing the issues, as a question of monopoly
power, while important, is insufficient to explain fully the media's failures to accurately and fully
report the issues, and not necessarily because the advent of cable and other new information
technologies have increased the number of players. Rather, the market should be seen as a broad,
information gathering forum. Thus, the relevant market includes all informational sources -
newspapers, radio, television, the Internet, magazines, books, journals, movies, group meetings,
and even one-on-one conversations. Even this broader market view does not provide enough
democratically necessary information.
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ocratically determined speech (the coverage and reportage that would be
chosen by a people assembled in some imaginary democratic conven-
tion).58 Clearly, the market is an imperfect reflection of what people
want and what democracy may require.
The major reason for this gap is that the profit motive creates incen-
tives for media executives not only to maximize revenue but also simul-
taneously to minimize costs. One way to maximize revenue is to target
audiences in terms of their purchasing power and susceptibility to adver-
tising. Media executives, therefore, determine the content and manner
of the material they present to the "public" based on the needs of their
advertisers. After all, they must be sure that what they report in their
broadcasts or newscasts helps rather than harms the sales of the adver-
tised products. One way of minimizing costs is to stay away from high-
cost newsgathering activities, such as any serious analysis and reporting
by the United States media about the democratic revolution in Haiti."
By slighting the reporting of high-cost news stories and tying the content
of their reporting to specific market segments, media executives fail to
live up to the democratic role of the press.
In addition, another perhaps even more serious problem with a mar-
ket-driven system is the incestuous nature of the relationship between
the media and political actors. For example, in the United States and in
developing democracies, the media receive large amounts of money for
advertisements from politicians running for office.60 More insidiously,
establishment media representatives have close personal relationships -
sometimes too close - with government officials.6 ' Indeed, many
media types, after serving in high government posts, return to highly
paid media positions.62 These relationships sometimes cause them to
58. See generally Fiss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 1.
59. For a well-argued criticism of the reporting of Larry Rohter, the New York Times reporter
who has covered Haiti since July 1994, see JACK LULE, DAILY NEWS, ETERNAL STORIES: THE
MYTHOLOGICA ROLE OF JOURNALISM 147-71 (2001).
60. See Online Newshour, Candidates Deluge New Hampshire Voters With Campaign Ads
Ahead of Primary (Jan. 22, 2004), at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/media/media-watch/jan-
june04/newhampshireads_01-22.html ("The price tag of the campaign ad blitzkrieg has reached
towering heights.").
61. William Satire, a Pulitzer Prize winning New York Times columnist, is often criticized
for his close friendship with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and has been labeled "a
mouthpiece for Sharon." See Aina Kristiansen, Safire Analyzes Washington, Bush's
'Heavyweights', CAROLINA COMMUNICATOR, July, 2002, available at http://www.jomc.unc.edu/
carolinacommunicator/archives/july2002/safire.html.
62. For example, George Stephanopoulos, former Director of Communications for the
Clinton/Gore campaign and Senior Advisor to the President for Policy and Strategy, is now the
anchor of This Week with George Stephanopoulos on ABC television. Dee Dee Myers, former
White House Press Secretary with the Clinton Administration is now a Contributing Editor to
Vanity Fair magazine. William Satire of the New York Times was once a speechwriter for
Richard Nixon.
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slight publicly important stories.63 It also implies that members of the
press are less likely to condemn publicly officials with whom they have
a personal relationship for violating the public trust.
For these reasons, reporters tend to rely too heavily on official gov-
ernment sources, report stories tardily, and, in the advanced industrial
nations, fail to do the hard work necessary to understand the problems of
nations undergoing the movement from authoritarianism to democracy.
An excellent example of all these problems is the disreputable reporting
of Haiti by the United States media over several decades. Most of the
mainstream United States media see "Haiti through the prism estab-
lished by racist Hollywood movies since the 30's."'6 Many of these
problems stem from a lack of understanding about Haitian history and
culture. Moreover, many of these reporters cannot speak Creole, the
only language that every Haitian can speak and, since 1994, the official
language of Haiti.
National reporters in developing democracies are prey to the same
inadequacies. To do a democratically necessary, credible job, a journal-
ist must be engaged, suspicious of government-controlled information,
intent on verifying the accuracy of all information he obtains, and have
knowledge and understanding of the culture and history of his nation.
All of this requires a real commitment to the vision of the importance of
a free press to democracy and absolute support from the media execu-
tives for fulfilling this role.
What, if any, solutions to these problems exist? Are there any gov-
ernmental institutions that can right the balance so that the people can be
properly informed on important public issues? Under the democratic
theory of free speech I have suggested, the state may, indeed must,
sometimes be called upon to counteract the impact that private aggrega-
tions of power - corporative powers - have on the freedom of the press
and freedom of expression so necessary for a viable democracy to flour-
63. The Kennedy years are a prime example. As one author makes clear:
For the most part, however, the Kennedy White House used the goodwill of the
press to keep Kennedy's misdeeds in the shadows. Kennedy was a master at giving
favored reporters such as Benjamin Bradlee of Newsweek the illusion of friendship
and just enough access to satisfy their desire to be on the inside of events without
making the journalists real players.
LEWIS L. GOULD, THE MODERN AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 131 (2004).
64. Jean Jean-Pierre, How the Major U.S. Media Are Undermining Democracy, 56 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 413, 417 (2002). For examples of inadequate and indeed sloppy reporting in Haiti,
particularly the inadequacy of the mainstream media's reporting on the United States
government's failure to act in accordance with its publicly stated goal of helping to create a stable
environment for democratic reform in Haiti, see Irwin P. Stotzky, On the Promise and Perils of
Democracy in Haiti, 29 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1 (1998).
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ish.6 5 I believe that, once again, the judiciary plays a crucial role in
helping the citizenry obtain the necessary information to make informed
choices on important public (and private) issues.
In many cases, instrumentalities of the state will try to stifle free
and open debate. In other instances, however, the state may have to act
to further public debate where private interests are stifling speech and
thus interfering with the creation and maintenance of a democracy.
Fiss's view of strong state activism to support a free press resonates
here. The state may have to allocate public resources - pass out micro-
phones - to those whose voices and views would not otherwise be
heard in the public square. This may even entail silencing the voices of
some in order to hear the voices of others. There may be no other way
to get the relevant information to the people. This democratic theory of
free speech and press can help nations succeed in their quests for democ-
ratization, but only if the press is diligent in fighting for and protecting
those rights. The press, in turn, must rely on the courts so the media can
perform their Fourth Estate function.
IV.
THE ROLE OF THE PRESS: A CLOSER LOOK
Several countries in Latin America, to varying degrees, have a rela-
tively open and diverse press that often engages in a dynamic and even
acrimonious debate on issues of public importance. But journalists in
these countries frequently face physical harm for their work from state
officials and state-sponsored thugs. In addition, a variety of laws and
constitutional clauses adversely affect freedom of speech and the press
and are narrowly interpreted and strictly enforced by the judiciary, lead-
ing to great harm for the hope of democratic development. In this sec-
tion, I trace some of these laws and the role the judiciary has played in
limiting freedom of speech and press, principally using Chile and Haiti
as examples.
The laws at issue as well as the actions of the judiciary in these
nations are reflective of most of the Latin American nations striving for
democracy. The lack of judicial activism and the formalistic interpreta-
tions of these laws demonstrate the weaknesses and problems of relying
on the judiciary to help create the necessary conditions for a vibrant
democracy to bloom. The court's actions also demonstrate the promise
of a judicial system that strongly promotes democratic development.
In Chile, unlike many other nations in Latin America, journalists
and opposition figures do not generally face physical harm, but public
65. Sometimes the press is a dangerous corporative force itself.
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debate is a far cry from being "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."66 In
point of fact, such debate is often muted, limited and timorous, as if
uninhibited expression is either somehow dangerous to society or per-
sonally risky to the speaker. Since the return of democracy to Chile in
1990, when Augusto Pinochet stepped down from power, violations of
freedom of expression are directly traceable not simply to repressive
actions by the executive branch, but to laws that fail to protect essential
democratic values and hamper the discussion that democracy demands.
Such violations are also caused by the mind-set and methods of the judi-
ciary when interpreting these laws against the background of constitu-
tional and democratic demands.
Chile, like many Latin American nations with civilian systems of
law, has traditionally been a society with an overenthusiastic respect for
the formalities of the written law. The jurisprudential tradition is to
view the judge's role in the most formal terms. His job is to apply the
law in its most literal sense. Consequently, the judiciary is extremely
reluctant to interpret laws in light of the underlying concerns, such as the
preservation of democratic values and international human rights princi-
ples.67 Indeed, judges appear to believe that their role is simply a techni-
cal one, and that it does not include any political or moral
responsibility.68
Several major areas of legislation in these Latin American nations
are particularly harmful to an open, democratic society that honors free-
dom of expression. In Chile, as in almost every Latin American nation,
there are at least two areas of legislation that are extremely harmful to a
free society. The first, known as descato (contempt) laws, restrict politi-
cal criticism of public officials and their policies by prohibiting expres-
sions that are considered offensive to senior officials in public positions
(state institutions).69 The second area concerns a range of laws that
strictly limit the public's right of access to government-controlled infor-
66. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
67. Many of the laws adversely affecting freedom of expression have their roots in the
nineteenth century and were refined and developed in the 1930s and during the Cold War era.
While progress to repeal or amend these laws in the legislative bodies has been extremely slow,
senior judges, with very few exceptions, have only superficially addressed the constitutional or
underlying human rights principles involved in these statutes.
68. See Jorge Correa Sutil, The Judiciary and the Political System in Chile: The Dilemmas of
Judicial Independence During the Transition to Democracy, in TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN
LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 89 (Irwin P. Stotzky ed., 1993).
69. For a compilation of these laws, see JAIRO LANAO, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND THE LAW
(1999). Of the twenty-four countries covered by this study, seventeen countries have insult law
provisions. They include:
Bolivia: C6DIGO PENAL art. 162 (Bol.)
Brazil: C6DIGO PENAL arts. 141, 331 (Braz.)
LEYS DE IMPRENSA, art. 23 (Braz.)
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mation far more strictly than the right of freedom of expression and
democracy demand.
Constitutional protection of the right to freedom of expression is
limited in both areas. The right to honor and privacy,7" like freedom of
expression,7' is guaranteed in the Chilean Constitution's Bill of Rights.
Paragraph 4, listed in the Bill of Rights, guarantees:
Respect for and protection of private and public life and the honor
(honra) of the individual and his family. Violation of this precept,
committed through a mass medium, whereby a false deed or action is
imputed unjustifiably causing harm or discredit to an individual or his
family, shall constitute a crime and shall be punished as determined
by law. However, the mass medium may claim exception by prov-
ing, before the corresponding court, the truth of the imputation,
unless it should constitute in itself a libel against private individuals.
Furthermore, the proprietors, editors, directors and administrators of
the respective mass medium shall be jointly responsible for the
appropriate indemnifications.7"
Chile: LAW ON STATE SECURITY, art. 6(b) (Chile) (repealed 2001).
See infra note 89.
C6DIGO PENAL arts. 263, 284 (Chile)
Costa Rica: CODIGO PENAL art. 307 (Costa Rica)
Cuba: C6DIGO PENAL art. 144 (Cuba)
Dominican C6DIGO PENAL art. 368 (Dom. Rep.)
Republic:
Ecuador: CODIGO PENAL arts. 230-31 (Ecuador)
El Salvador: C6DIGO PENAL art. 339 (El Sal.)
Guatemala: GUAT. CONST. art. 35, 2
CoDIGO PENAL arts. 411-12 (Guat.)
Haiti: CODIGO PENAL arts. 183-85 (Haiti)
Honduras: C6DIGO PENAL arts. 323-25 (Hond.)
Mexico: PRINT LAW OF 1917, arts. 2-5, 33 (Mex.)
CODIGO CIVIL art. 189 (Mex.)
Nicaragua: CODIGO PENAL art. 347-48 (Nicar.)
Panama: C6DIGO PENAL art. 307-08 (Pan.)
Peru: C6ODIGO PENAL art. 347 (Peru)
Uruguay: C6DIGO PENAL art. 173 (Uru.)
Venezuela: C6oDIGO PENAL arts. 223, 226-28 (Venez.)
70. CHILE CONST. art. 19(4) (The Bill of Rights).
71. CHILE CONST. art. 19(12).
72. CHILE CONST. art. 19(4) (The Bill of Rights). The inclusion of honor and privacy in the
Chilean Bill of Rights is consistent with international human rights law. Article 17 of the United
Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides: "No one shall be subjected
to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to
unlawful attacks on his honor or reputation." G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No.
16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). Article 11 of the American Convention holds that everyne has the
right to have his honor respected and his dignity recognized; no one may be the object of arbitrary
or abusive interference with his private life, his family, his home, or his correspndence, or of
unlawful attacks on his honor or reputation; everyone has the right to the protection of the law
against such interference or attacks. American Convention on Human Rights, July 18, 1978, art.
11, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
2003]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
The term honra in Spanish refers to a person's public reputation or
prestige. Chilean law distinguishes defamation from offenses against
honor, which involve not only public esteem but also its subjective or
personal aspect, such as an offense against a person's self-respect or the
honor of his or her family. 73 Offenses against honor constitute libel
(injurias). There is an important difference between defamation and
libel. The defendant in a defamation suit may establish innocence by
proving the truth of the offensive statement (exceptio veritatis). In the
case of libel, however, truth is not a defense unless the person affected is
a public servant and the injurious statement concerns his or her official
function. The rule that the defense of truth is not applicable has also
generally been applied to prosecutions under the Law on State Security.
Article 19(12) of the Chilean Constitution guarantees:
Freedom to express opinions and to disseminate information without
prior censorship in any form and by any means, without prejudice to
assuming the responsibility for any crimes or abuses committed in the
exercise of such freedoms, in conformity with the law which is to be
passed by a special quorum.7 4
Article 19(12) of the Chilean Constitution thus provides explicit protec-
tion to "the freedom to express opinions and to disseminate information"
and prohibits "prior censorship in any form. '75 However, it does not
specify on what grounds the right may be restricted by the imposition of
legal penalties for its misuse, beyond saying that such grounds must be
established by law. Nevertheless, abuses must be dealt with by the
imposition of subsequent penalties, not by prior censorship. Article
19(4) also explicitly safeguards the rights of others to be protected from
abuses of freedom of expression.76
The correct balance between the enjoyment of these competing
rights must be struck by the courts when they investigate accusations of
the misuse of freedom of expression. While both the right to honor and
privacy and the right to freedom of expression are important, the latter is
not protected sufficiently from restrictions imposed in the name of honor
or privacy. Unfortunately, judicial precedent established in recent years
considers the right to honor and privacy to have superior status to that of
freedom of expression, a position that has no support in the constitution.
This doctrine has led to instances of prior censorship by the courts, vio-
lating the constitutional prohibition of this practice, not to mention dem-
ocratic requirements. In addition, there is no explicit guarantee of the
73. Jose Luis Cea Egafia, Estatuto Constitucional de la Informacidn y Opini6n, 8 REVISTA
CHILENA DE DERECHO 186-97 (1981).
74. A special quorum is an absolute majority of the deputies and senators holding office.
75. CHILE CONST. art. 19(12).
76. CHILE CONST. art. 19(4).
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public's right of access to information, and many of the most serious
restrictions emanate from the courts themselves. 7
Alejandra Matus's miserable ordeal with the Chilean judiciary
clearly illustrates the devastating effect of the descato laws. On a
broader level, her experience demonstrates the Chilean courts'
extremely restricted view of freedom of expression and the harm such a
vision has on democracy. Matus, a Chilean investigative journalist,
spent six years scrutinizing the Chilean judicial system. This investiga-
tive work resulted in a book, The Black Book of Chilean Justice,7 8 pub-
lished in 1999. The book traces the history of the Chilean high court
from its origins through 1999, and concludes that there has never been a
truly independent judiciary in Chile. Rather, Matus finds that the Chil-
ean judicial system has been and remains inundated with corruption and
incompetence. In the past, this state of the judiciary clearly benefited -
and benefited from - Pinochet's military dictatorship.
To understand Matus's book, one must understand the context of
the administrative system of the Chilean judiciary. As Jorge Correa
Sutil has conclusively shown, Chilean judges may be independent in
several senses, but it is an extremely narrow vision of independence that
insulates judges from the consequences of their actions.7 9 In Chile,
judges are constrained to such a great extent by a pervasive legal culture
that they can even justify ignoring executive branch abuses of human
rights in the name of upholding the law.
The Chilean judiciary, like many of the court systems in Latin
America, is an extremely hierarchical organization, comparable to a mil-
itary structure. The supreme court, at the top of the pyramid, annually
creates a list of judges and examines the qualifications of its members to
determine which should be promoted to a higher position (from judge to
magistrate of the court of appeals, for example). The government even-
tually selects those designated for promotion from the lists the supreme
court draws up. Citizens do not participate in the selection of judges,
nor does any government department oversee the conduct of the highest
court officials. The singular and dramatic method of political control is
solely congressional impeachment. Until recently, the last word on
nominations to the supreme court and courts of appeal came from the
executive branch of the government. Recent changes in the law, how-
ever, require ratification from two-thirds of the senate.
77. For a thorough and detailed analysis of many of these issues see Memorandum on Law of
Freedom of Opinion and Information and the Practice of Journalism, from Gabriel G. Goldberg to
Irwin P. Stotzky (Sept. 24, 2002) (on file with author).
78. ALEJANDRA MATUS, EL LIBRO NEGRO DE LA JUSTICIA CHILENA (1999).
79. See Sutil, supra note 68.
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A judge who lives in this structure must defer to the desires of his
superiors in order to be promoted. Because most judicial decisions are
made in secret, lawyers and lobbyists can visit the judges ex parte after
working hours without any notice in the public record. The secretive
nature of the Chilean process invites corruption, abuse of power, nepo-
tism and other irregularities. This state of affairs exists not only in Chile
but in many Latin American nations, as well as other nations undergoing
the transition process.
On April 14, 1999, less than twenty-four hours after the public
presentation of Matus's book, the judiciary ordered the police to confis-
cate the first editions. 80 The Chilean government filed charges against
her under Chile's Law on State Security - the Chilean descato law.8 In
Chile, contempt of authority provisions exist in the Criminal Code,8" in
the Law on State Security,83 and in the Code of Military Justice.84
These laws are premised on the view that people are required to respect
those in authority simply because they hold positions of power. Such a
view is antithetical to democracy because it defines the ordinary person
as a mere subject rather than as an autonomous citizen. It also violates
one of the fundamental principles underlying the concept of human
rights because it suggests that the powerful have the absolute right and
authority to determine important issues that affect the vital interests of
the people without the people's participation in the decision-making pro-
cess and without their consent.
The Chilean government formally charged Matus under the con-
tempt of authority provisions in the Law on State Security, which poten-
tially criminalizes criticism of a member of congress, a high court justice
or the chief of police, among others. Under Article 6(b)85 of the law, it
is an offense against public order to insult the president, ministers of
state, senators, deputies, members of the higher courts of justice, the
comptroller general, commander-in-chief of the armed forces or the
director general of the national police, regardless of whether the defama-
tion, libel or calumny is committed with respect to the exercise of offi-
cial functions of the offended party. Ironically, the very institution that
is called upon in a democracy to protect speakers who criticize the gov-
ernment is not only the object of the criticism but also the institution that
80. Alejandra Matus, The Black Book of Chilean Justice, 56 U. MiAmi L. REV. 329 (2002).
81. LAW ON STATE SECURrrY, No. 12,927, art. 6(b) (Chile) (repealed 2001).
82. The provisions in the Criminal Code (arts. 263-64) that protect the president, government
ministers, members of congress, and the judiciary from libelous attacks have been rarely used.
CODIO PENAL, arts. 263-64 (Chile).
83. LAW ON STATE SECURITY, No. 12,927, art. 6(b) (Chile) (repealed 2001).
84. CODIGO PENAL MwrrAR, art. 284 (Chile).
85. LAW ON STATE SECURrrY, No. 12,927, art. 6(b) (Chile) (repealed 2001).
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enforces the ban against free and open criticism of public officials on
matters of public concern.
The descato laws are even more insidious and destructive to free
speech than it may first appear. Contempt of authority offenses are dealt
with by application of special norms that reduce due process guarantees
and rights of defense and also carry higher penalties than other types of
similar laws. For example, the maximum penalty under Article 6(b)8 6 is
five years in prison while the maximum penalty for libel or calumny is
only three years in prison. In addition, under this descato law, investiga-
tive procedures are telescoped and thus provide significantly less time
for defense than the crime of libel in the Criminal Code. The law also
allows a judge to order immediate seizure of all materials containing any
abuse of publicity that is condemned by this law.87 Even more devastat-
ing to notions of free speech is the fact that truth is not a defense to these
charges.
The charges against Matus, including a possible five-year prison
term, caused her to flee Chile and successfully seek political asylum in
the United States. 88 Matus represents the best in journalism - a woman
who stood up for truth and accountability and is a living example of a
model citizen in a democracy. Because of her principled stand against
authoritarianism, and international pressure, the Chilean government has
repealed Article 6(b).89
86. Id.
87. Article 16(b) states in pertinent part:
If a crime against the Security of the State were to be committed using the press,
radio or television, the competent court may suspend the publication of up to ten
editions of the guilty newspaper or magazine and for up to ten days the broadcasting
of programs of the transgressing radio station or television channel. Without
prejudice of this decision, in aggravated cases, the court may order the immediate
confiscation of any edition in which the abuse in advertising is expressly
manifested. The court shall exercise similar powers with respect to any other
edition ostensibly issued for the purpose of replacing the one being sanctioned.
LAW ON STATE SECURITY, No. 12,927, art. 16(b) (Chile) (repealed 2001).
88. See Matus, supra note 80.
89. On April 10, 2001, the Chilean Senate approved a new press law, the Law on Freedoms of
Opinion and Information and the Practice of Journalism, that repeals portions of the National
Security Law that affect Matus's case. The new press law repeals Article 6(b) of the Law on State
Security (the law Matus was prosecuted under). Felipe Gonzdlez, Access to Information and
National Security in Chile, in NATIONAL SECuRrrY AND OPEN GOVERNMENT: STrIKiNG THE RIGHT
BALANCE 169, 174 (Campbell Public Affairs Institute, 2003). The new law also repeals Article
16, which allowed judges to confiscate any material used to commit a "crime against the Security
of the State." Under the new law, journalists will be able to keep their sources secret, courts will
no longer be allowed to gag the media from reporting criminal cases, and all prosecutions of press
offenses will be handled by civilian instead of military courts. The law did not repeal Article 30
of the Law on State Security, which requires judges to confiscate any material that "might have
been used" to commit any crime against state security. LAW ON STATE SECURITY, No. 12,927, art.
30 (Chile). Although the law represents a major step forward in some of Chile's legal framework
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In addition to these descato laws, in which truth is not a defense,
and to the laws limiting public access to government-controlled informa-
tion, both of which are obviously extremely harmful to creating an envi-
ronment conducive to the exercise of free speech and press, there are
many other laws in Latin American countries that hinder the public
debate necessary to a well-functioning democracy. In a study conducted
by the Inter-American Press Association,90 the author, Jairo Lanao, com-
for press freedom, it also contains several troubling provisions. For example, the law limits the
definition of a journalist to a person who has a university degree from a recognized journalism
school and to "those whom the law recognizes as such." While the law establishes a right to the
protection of sources, it restricts this right to "recognized" journalists, journalism students doing
an internship, recent journalism school graduates, publishers, editors and foreign correspondents.
It also increases allowable damages, providing for additional compensatory damages in the case of
libel or defamation committed by the press. In addition, it contains a conscience clause and a
mandatory requirement for the press to publish corrections and clarifications. For a detailed
analysis of this new law, see Goldberg, supra note 77.
90. See LANAO, supra note 69. This study resulted from a hemispheric conference held at
Chapultepec Castle in Mexico City in March, 1994. The conference, which brought together 135
leading politicians, writers, academics, constitutional lawyers, editors and private citizens from the
Western Hemisphere, resulted in a document - known as the Declaration of Chapultepec -
announcing ten significant principles necessary for a free press to perform its democratic mission.
These principles are:
1. No people or society can be free without freedom of expression and of the
press. The exercise of this freedom is not something authorities grant, it is an
inalienable right of the people.
2. Every person has the right to seek and receive information, express opinions
and disseminate them freely. No one may restrict or deny these rights.
3. The authorities must be compelled by law to make available in a timely and
reasonable manner the information generated by the public sector. No
journalist may be forced to reveal his or her sources of information.
4. Freedom of expression and of the press are severely limited by murder,
terrorism, kidnapping, intimidation, the unjust imprisonment of journalists, the
destruction of facilities, violence of any kind and impunity for perpetrators.
Such acts must be investigated promptly and punished harshly.
5. Prior censorship, restrictions on the circulation of the media or dissemination of
their reports, arbitrary management of information, the imposition of obstacles
to the free flow of news, and restrictions on the activities and movements of
journalists directly contradict freedom of the press.
6. The media and journalists should neither be discriminated against nor favored
because of what they write or say.
7. Tariff and exchange policies, licenses for the importation of paper or news-
gathering equipment, the assigning of radio and television frequencies and the
granting or withdrawal of government advertising may not be used to reward or
punish the media or individual journalists.
8. The membership of journalists in guilds, their affiliation to professional and
trade associations and the affiliation of the media with business groups must be
strictly voluntary.
9. The credibility of the press is linked to its commitment to truth, to the pursuit of
accuracy, fairness and objectivity and to the clear distinction between news and
advertising. The attainment of these goals and the respect for ethical and
professional values may not be imposed. These are the exclusive responsibility
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piled the laws in Latin American nations that adversely affect the rights
of a free press and freedom of speech and expression.
This exhaustive study leads to several conclusions that hold across
the board for all of these nations. For example, it is clear that criminal
libel laws and their close relative, the insult laws, are most frequently
employed to attack the press. Moreover, every nation in the hemisphere
and all branches of government are responsible for these problems. No
government institution is spared from criticism. Every branch of gov-
ernment in these nations is implicated in some form and degree in sup-
pressing freedom of speech. To put it another way, the legislative,
executive and judicial branches all enact these limitations and apply
them. Thus, journalists and publishers can be charged with a crime and
sent to jail for publishing information that is accurate or for attacking the
honor or reputation of a person, even in his public life. Moreover, truth
is not a defense to most of these charges.
Another obstacle to a free press is the requirement that journalists
obtain prior authorization to work, such as obtaining degrees or holding
membership in a designated organization. Moreover, most of these
nations restrict or forbid the publication of electoral information on the
eve of, or during, elections. In addition, right to reply laws, the creation
of special courts to try illegal acts committed through the news media,
and laws restricting access to government controlled information, such
as the absolute secrecy of criminal court records, impinge on freedom of
speech and press and directly harm the development of a democracy.
To counter some of these problems, it may be necessary to enact
reforms, such as the creation of routine defenses, standards of conduct,
and guidelines for the judicial review of issues touching on the freedoms
of speech and press. Moreover, each nation must develop a set of rules
regarding evidentiary burdens of persuasion and production guidelines
for estimating awards for harm to one's reputation and other intangible
of journalists and the media. In a free society, it is public opinion that rewards
or punishes.
10. No news medium nor journalist may be punished for publishing the truth or
criticizing or denouncing the government.
This compilation of laws flags authoritarian remnants in the legislation of twenty-four countries
that honor these principles. The study includes interviews with media experts in all of these
countries. This was the first study ever made that compiles information on all of the laws
affecting freedom of speech and press in the Western Hemisphere. The book is written against the
backdrop of these ten principles. Moreover, it convincingly demonstrates the adverse affect of
these laws on these principles and, consequently, to the development and consolidation of
democracy. According to the author of the study, the presidents of almost every Latin American
nation have endorsed these principles and agreed to abide by them. Interview with Jairo Lanao,
Attorney for the Inter-American Press Association, in Miami, Fla. (Sept. 7, 2002). This suggests
that the judiciary in these nations shall interpret laws that affect freedom of speech and press in
light of these principles. Unfortunately, this is not the case.
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harms. Other, more drastic, legal reforms also are necessary. These
include eliminating insult law provisions that shield government offi-
cials from criticism, decriminalizing libel, and developing civil law rem-
edies for certain violations, such as the right to privacy, that are now
criminal in nature. In addition, it may be helpful to use United States
Supreme Court legal doctrines as a guiding, but not definitive model.
Finally, judges and lawyers must be educated about the importance of
these principles to free speech and democracy and in the technical
aspects of the necessary legal doctrines that will ensure their protection.
The judiciary necessarily has the central role in creating legal doctrines
to meet these challenges. 9'
Perhaps an even more serious problem than these laws for a free
press, freedom of expression, and democratic reform, is the violence
perpetrated against journalists by state officials or their agents, and the
failure of the courts to bring these criminals to justice.92 In the civilian
inquisitorial system, such as those in Latin America and Haiti, judges
usually conduct the investigations into crimes. If the courts fail to bring
to justice the criminals who have committed these terrible acts, this fail-
ure obviously has a dramatic negative impact on the building of demo-
cratic institutions and on the legitimacy of the rule of law. As
previously discussed, one of the main problems in the transition and
consolidation process, in addition to the economic, political and social
crises and the problem of corporatism, is the failure to follow the rule of
law in both the formal and informal aspects of public and private life.
This is also a failure of legitimacy and of confidence in legal institutions
and public officials.
An excellent example of the harm to democracy when murderers
are not brought to justice is the murder of Jean Dominique, a prominent
Haitian broadcast journalist. The subsequent judicial investigation has
only exacerbated the problem for the courts, the media and the citizens
whose most fervent hopes rest with democracy. Unless one is intimately
familiar with the political and social history and culture of Haiti, it is
almost impossible to imagine the negative impact Dominique's death
had on citizens' belief in the legitimacy of the government, the legal
system, the judiciary, and the rule of law.93
The Haitian peoples' view of the rule of law has historical support.
Since Haiti's independence in 1804, the rule of law has been seen as a
91. See discussion supra Part III.
92. Colombia, Mexico, Guatemala, and Brazil have the highest murder rates of journalists.
JAIRO E. LANAO, COMPARATIVE STUDY: THE PRESS LAWS AND CHAPULTEPEC (forthcoming 2004).
93. See infra text accompanying notes 94-113.
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cruel joke.94 During the coup period (1991-94), for example, members
of the Haitian armed forces systematically assassinated and tortured
thousands of people, including government officials who attempted to
uphold the rule of law. The military blatantly ignored judicial orders to
arrest soldiers or officers accused of human rights abuses. The military
also ignored the basic rights guaranteed by the constitution and any laws
passed by parliament that threatened its hold on power.95 A Creole
proverb aptly summarizes the Haitian people's view about law in light
of the military's continuing abuses: "Law is paper; bayonet is steel."
The Jean Dominique case supports this rather cynical view of the legiti-
macy of the legal system and the rule of law.
The violation of legal norms, however, is not restricted to formal
military or de facto government officials.9 6 Unfortunately, such behav-
ior is a distinguishing mark of political and social life at large, and has
existed throughout the nation's history. This failure to follow the rule of
law is evident in both social practices and in the actions of government
officials.
The tendency toward unlawfulness does not, however, infect only
government officials. This mentality correlates with a general trend
toward anomie in society as a whole. For example, it manifests itself in
public and private corruption regarding economic and social matters. It
helps create and secure black markets and a common practice of violat-
ing the most basic rules of society. Law is perceived as chaos, corrup-
tion, and simply a tool that belongs to the most powerful members of
society to use as they wish.
This mentality is both the product and the cause of collective action
problems. Frequently, the combination of expectations, interests, pos-
sibilities of actions, and their respective payoffs is such that the rational
course of action for each participant in the process of political or social
interaction is not to comply with a certain norm, despite the fact that
general compliance with it would have benefited everybody - in
Pareto's terms - or almost everybody. This "dumb anomie" is inti-
mately connected with both the stunting and the reversal of economic
and social development.
Therefore, for a successful transition to democracy to occur in
Haiti, or in any Latin American nation, it is critical for that nation to
consolidate the rule of law. This is important not only to secure respect
94. For a discussion of the deficiencies in the fulfillment of the requirements of the rule of
law in Haiti, see STOT-ZKY, supra note 21, at 90-101.
95. See generally LAWYERS COMMrrrEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, PAPER LAWS, STEEL
BAYONErS: BREAKDOWN OF THE RULE OF LAW IN HAITI (1990).
96. Nor is it restricted to Haiti. This anomie exists in almost every nation undergoing the
transition process.
20031
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
for fundamental rights and for the observance of the democratic process,
but also to achieve satisfactory levels of economic and social develop-
ment. The international community, if it is to become a positive force in
these nations, must help in the process of consolidating the rule of law.
In Haiti, for example, the international community seems to have misun-
derstood the contours of the rule of law, placing its resources almost
solely into "strengthening" the judiciary. Even those efforts have not
appreciably improved the system of justice. In point of fact, despite the
international community's best efforts to strengthen the integrity of the
judicial system, it remains corrupt and inefficient. Indeed, years of cor-
ruption and governmental neglect have left the judicial system nearly
moribund. For instance, a shortage of adequately trained judges and
prosecutors, among other systemic problems, has created a huge backlog
of criminal cases, with many detainees waiting months or even years in
pretrial detention before receiving a court hearing. If an accused person
ultimately is tried and found not guilty, there is no redress against the
government for the time served.97 While it is certainly necessary to
strengthen the judiciary, this is simply insufficient to achieve the goal of
establishing the rule of law in Haiti.
As this discussion demonstrates, the problems associated with the
transition from authoritarianism to democracy and the consolidation pro-
cess itself are complicated and all-encompassing, and require an almost
complete overhaul of past practices. Moreover, because of the illiteracy
and extreme poverty in Haiti, the broadcast media, particularly radio,
must play an unusually important role in the democratization process.
The electronic media, particularly radio, are almost the only means of
transmitting important information about the relevant issues and their
possible solutions to the vast majority of people. It is therefore abso-
lutely critical to the democratization process that there be a lively,
engaged, professional broadcast media striving to meet their Fourth
Estate function. This is why the murder of an important journalist and
the failure of the judicial investigation to bring the murderer to justice
are so harmful to the development of a democracy.98
Jean Dominique spent his professional life meeting the democratic
demands of a journalist. He was the most celebrated radio journalist in
Haitian history. It is almost impossible to overestimate Dominique's
importance to the political life of Haiti and the Haitian people's hope for
creating a democracy and a better life. Indeed, the vast majority of the
97. See U.S. State Dep't, 1999 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: HAITI
(2000), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/islands/haitihr2000.htm; See generally
STOTZKY, supra note 21.
98. Such injustice or failure of the legal system also ratifies the prevalent view of the Haitian
people about law and justice.
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Haitian people who had been shut out of the nation's political life for
almost 200 years, and who took part in the democratic explosion at the
grass-roots level in the 1980s and early 1990s, viewed Dominique as a
progressive force who helped give formal expression to their lives.
Many of the people's hopes represented by Dominique were dashed on
April 3, 2000, when he was assassinated as he arrived at his radio station
to begin his daily broadcasts.
Dominique was born into Haiti's light-skinned mulatto elite, but
broke ranks to become an early champion of the country's overwhelm-
ing number of poor peasants and slum dwellers. He was considered an
enemy of his class because of his life-long support for the poor in Haiti.
After training as an agronomist in France, he turned to journalism as a
vehicle for social change. In the 1960s, he hosted a one-man program
on a time-leased slot on Radio Haiti. By 1971, he had purchased the
station, and began a meteoric rise in the profession resulting from his
eloquence and lively, even bombastic style and willingness to challenge
abusers of power.
Dominique simply revolutionized Haitian broadcasting. Realizing
radio's potential to reach the country's illiterate poor majority, he began
broadcasting not just in French, the language of the elite, but also in
Creole.99 Traditionally, newspapers and radio used only French, thus
excluding more than ninety percent of the population. Broadcasting in
Creole, therefore, was a revolutionary act. It expanded democratic hori-
zons for the Haitian people and broke their traditional isolation. People
in the most remote parts of Haiti, pejoratively referred to as "the country
outside," began to understand the politics of "the Republic of Port-au-
Prince."' ° The strategy of dividing and separating the peasants into
small units would no longer work as a method of keeping power in the
99. Variations in the use of language are one manifestation of cultural division. All Haitians
speak Haitian Creole to some degree of fluency; eight to ten percent of the population (the elites)
speaks French well enough to claim fluency. Only a tiny minority within the elites, however, is
truly bilingual in French and Creole. More important than the fact of bilingualism are the number
of times elite children are told that it is unacceptable for members of their class to speak Creole.
Until Aristide's reinstatement to office in 1994, French was the official language in schools and in
the judicial system. In this way, language has been effectively used as a social barrier and one
that denies majority participation in certain state institutions. Thus, language was used to exclude
approximately ninety percent of Haitians from any political, social or economic power.
Dominique's use of Creole in his radio broadcasting was a political act of great courage.
100. Interview with Michele Montas-Dominique, Co-owner and Broadcast Journalist for Radio
Haiti Inter and currently, Spokesperson, Office of the President of the United Nations General
Assembly, in Miami, Fla. (June 27, 2001) and in Port-au-Prince, Haiti (Oct. 15, 2001). In 1986,
after the fall of the Duvalier regime, there was a nascent journalistic rejuvenation. This so-called
rebirth did not open up the political arena. The vast majority remained excluded from the political
sphere. Nevertheless, to a degree, it promoted the rights of free speech and association. Montas-
Dominique argues that while between 1986 and 1991 the press remained an "echo chamber for
opinions," this muted role still contributed to the rebuilding of Haitian civil society in the major
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hands of a small but ruthless elite."' Broadcasting in Creole also helped
to break the mass economic slavery. For example, coffee growers in one
part of Haiti could now hear the price of coffee on the international
markets and compare the prices of coffee traders all over the country.
The use of Creole had other revolutionary effects. It helped
empower the majority. It spread the methods and spirit of resistance, it
gave a voice to the majority's problems, and it allowed the people to
discuss possible solutions. Even with this new opportunity for open-
ness, it remained dangerous for newspaper and radio journalists to cover
political topics. Nevertheless, journalists continued to talk of previously
unacceptable political topics. The "golden age of pioneers" ended
abruptly on November 28, 1980, however, when the political police
closed Radio Haiti. They ransacked its studios, jailed Radio Haiti's
journalists, and tortured several of them. They also arrested many other
activists - journalists, human rights activists, labor union leaders and
students. These actions coerced other radio stations to stop their broad-
casting. Even in the face of these very real threats, Dominique perse-
vered. Over four decades, his vehement, witty and deeply probing
editorials became famous for denouncing government officials (dicta-
tors) and powerful private-sector actors who abused their authority and
caused great harm to the people and the nation.
While there were things in Haiti that Dominique dared not report
on directly, he cleverly used accounts of upheaval in other repressed
countries as a way to raise political awareness at home. In 1979, for
example, the station closely followed the toppling of the Somoza dicta-
torship in Nicaragua and the fall of the Shah of Iran, using this informa-
tion as a poorly disguised vision for Haiti. He did not make these
statements lightly. Dominique was acutely aware of the dangers he ran.
He jokingly called his style of consciousness-raising journalism "risky
business."102 The bullet-riddled facade of the Radio Haiti Inter building
testifies to the station's front line role in the country's fight for freedom
and democracy. The bullets date from at least six different attacks
between 1980 and 1994.
Dominique and his wife, Michele Montas-Dominique, were twice
forced to flee into exile. On their return to Haiti in 1986 after the col-
lapse of the Duvalier regime, a crowd of at least 60,000 joyous people
greeted the Dominiques at the International Airport of Port-au-Prince.
The supporters celebrated wildly, and some people hoisted Dominique
cities because it allowed for the free circulation of ideas and information. The media did not,
however, venture into serious investigative journalism.
101. See generally STOTZKY, supra note 21.
102. See Montas-Dominique, supra note 100.
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on their shoulders above the throng. With the help of donations from all
over the country, Radio Haiti Inter was rebuilt.
The station soon was charting an emerging grass-roots popular
movement known as Lavalas, led by a diminutive Salesian priest with a
reputation for radical discourse: Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Dominique
became an enthusiastic supporter of Aristide's victorious 1990 presiden-
tial campaign. He described it at the time as "the most wonderful expe-
rience of my life."' 3 But when a bloody military coup forced Aristide
from power in 1991, Dominique's radio station was shut down.10 4 He
and his wife spent two months in hiding before fleeing once again to
New York. Only when United States troops intervened in 1994 to rein-
state Aristide were the Dominiques able to return.
Over the years, Dominique became intensely popular throughout
Haiti, especially among peasants in the countryside, because his station
often addressed issues of land ownership and agriculture. His station
was not only the first to offer Creole-language radio programs, a deci-
sion later copied by others, but also the first to deliver sizzling tirades
against corrupt politicians and businessmen. Dominique's focus and
perseverance helped lay the "groundwork for an independent press in
Haiti." 10 5
An early Aristide supporter, Dominique embraced Aristide's demo-
cratically elected successor and fellow agronomist, President Ren6
Pr~val, who served from 1996 to February 2001. Pr6val and Dominique
both believed in bringing change to Haiti through political access in the
countryside. Together they founded Kozepep, a peasant organization
that had the backing of untold numbers of peasants and that organized
thousands of peasants for political meetings and other actions. The
organization eventually ran into problems with the Lavalas leadership,
who saw it as competition. Several Kozepep members were attacked by
Lavalas people in Haiti's interior. Although many serious problems
affected the Pr6val government, including his entirely constitutional
103. See id.
104. Dominique's bravery brought him international renown. For example, the Academy
Award winning director Jonathan Demme has spent the past fifteen years working on a
documentary film about Dominique's life entitled The Agronomist. In 2004, it was one of twelve
films to be considered for nomination for the 2004 Academy Award but was not selected as one of
the five finalists. Interview with Michele Montas-Dominique, in Princeton, N.J. (Feb. 18-19,
2004). The film has won other awards, including the Chicago Film Festival's Gold Plaque for
Best Documentary Feature. See Chicago International Film Festival, The 39th Chicago
International Film Festival Awards, at http://www.chicagofilmfestival.org/cgi-bin/WebObjects/
CIFFSite.woa/wa/pages/Fest-winners03 (last visited Mar. 9, 2004).
105. Continuing interview with Jean-Jean Pierre, Reporter for The Village Voice and
Musician, in Miami, Fla., New York, N.Y., and Port-au-Prince, Haiti (1994-2003).
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decision to dissolve the parliament, Dominique maintained hope for an
improved society during Pr6val's presidency.
Dominique's murder stunned the country, 1°6 provoking demonstra-
tions and massive displays of mourning. Prdval declared three days of
mourning and ordered the national palace draped in black. Approxi-
mately 16,000 people packed the capital's soccer stadium for Domi-
nique's funeral. Unfortunately, as of the publishing of this volume,
Dominique's killers have not yet been brought to justice.
The search for the assassins has turned into a dramatic test of
Haiti's justice system, an opportunity to gauge its strength and reliabil-
ity, and a way of helping Haiti improve the system and end impunity.
The issues involved in the case must become a part of the ongoing pub-
lic debate. The press must be in the vanguard of the discussion and
provide the relevant information to the public.
The investigation has not gone well. 1°7 The original investigating
judge attempted to do a serious job, but apparently was stymied at every
turn. Bodies have disappeared, suspects have died unexpectedly, and
the cast of characters who are said to have conspired to kill Dominique
play parts in a story more colorful than one the most creative mystery
writer could dream up. The threats against the judge, witnesses and
investigators have been palpable. For example, a man who was alleg-
edly passing on information about Dominique's murder was killed in
broad daylight in Port-au-Prince. The original judge fled to Miami and
refused to return to Haiti, claiming both a lack of security and a lack of
resources that the Haitian government had promised him. On Christmas
Day 2002, an attempt was made on the life of Michele Montas-Domi-
nique, Dominique's widow and co-host of Inter Actualities, Radio
Haiti's most popular morning show. 08 As of September 2002, the
newly appointed investigating judge in the Jean Dominique case was
just beginning his work. On March 21, 2003, after several other judges
botched different aspects of the case, Judge Bernard Saint-Vil issued an
indictment accusing Dymsley Millien, Jeudi-Jean Daniel, Philippe
106. It also shocked neighboring nations, nations in Latin America, and Europe, and it even
had a major impact in the United States.
107. For a devastating critique of the investigation, see Michele Montas-Dominique, Is
Another Assassination of Jean Dominique About to Take Place? (Radio Haiti Editorial, Mar. 3,
2002).
108. Montas-Dominique escaped the attempt, but, unfortunately, one of her bodyguards was
killed. Regis Bourgeat, Radio Station Chief Survives Murder Attempt, REPORTERS SAN
FRONTIPRES, Dec. 26, 2002, available at http://www.rsf.ofg. This caused her to flee Haiti for the
United States. This attack has yet to be fully investigated. In Feb. 2003, Montas-Dominique
closed Radio Haiti Inter indefinitely out of concern for the safety of the staff. See Amnesty




Markington, Ralph Lger, Ralph Joseph, and Freud Junior Demarat of
the murders. Dany Toussaint, a prominent ruling-party senator and for-
mer police chief, was widely believed to be involved in the crime, but
was not indicted for lack of evidence. Montas-Dominique vehemently
criticized the decision for failing to charge those who, she alleged, were
the intellectual authors of the crime. "It is outrageous, it does not
answer any questions," she said.'019 Montas-Dominque appealed the
indictments and the Court of Appeal ordered that the investigation be re-
opened to address the issues she raised. The Court of Appeal also dis-
missed the indictments of three of the six detainees for insufficient evi-
dence and ordered their release. 0 One of the defendants appealed this
ruling to the Supreme Court, which stayed the Court of Appeal ruling.
The case remains in this posture."' So far, the judicial system has not
been able to bring the killers to justice and the rule of law remains elu-
sive. The Haitian people continue to chant their apparently accurate
mantra: "Law is paper, bayonet is steel."
Since Dominique's death and the failed investigation, other report-
ers have been murdered, harmed and threatened. 12 With the exception
of a few brave reporters, such as Michele Montas-Dominique, the press
has completely failed to do the investigative reporting on the murders of
Jean Dominique and others - reporting that is necessary to make govern-
ment accountable in a democracy. Violence against journalists first led
to fear and then to a discontinuance of the investigative and legal (judi-
cial) work necessary to bring these cases to public attention and to
resolve them.
In attempting to exercise the sovereign prerogative of collective
self-governance, the people must obtain the relevant information neces-
sary to make the morally correct or at least the democratically appropri-
ate decisions. The hope of democracy is to have "the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources."''
3
109. Press Release, Committee to Protect Journalists, Haiti: Six Men Indicted for Journalist's
Murder, (Mar. 25, 2003), at http://www.cpj.org/news/2003/Haiti25mar03na.html.
110. See Amnesty International, supra note 35, at 14 & n.22.
111. Interview with Michele Montas-Dominique, Co-owner and Broadcast Journalist for Radio
Haiti Inter and currently, Spokesperson, Office of the President of the United Nations General
Assembly, in Princeton, N.J. (Feb. 18-19, 2004).
112. For example, on September 26, 2002, Radio Kiskeya, one of Haiti's most popular radio
stations, shut down after receiving "very serious and grave threats." The station was being
targeted for reporting on public issues; in particular, the recent disappearance of a community
organizer and the arrest of a leading advocate for investors who lost money - sometimes their
life savings - in a pyramid scheme that rocked Haiti. See Michael Deibert, Haiti Radio Station
Suspends Broadcasts After Death Threats, REUTERS PRESS, Sept. 28, 2002, available at http://
www.haitipolicy.org/content/218.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2004).
113. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1994).
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Informed public opinion is the most potent of all safeguards against mis-
government. The organized press is, of course, the principal institution
that performs the function of providing the relevant information to the
people.
To put it another way, the paramount function of freedom of speech
and press is to assure the proper working of democracy by protecting the
free exchange of political information and ideas. Professor Alexander
Meiklejohn put it this way:
Just so far as, at any point, the citizens who are to decide an issue are
denied acquaintance with information or opinion or doubt or disbelief
or criticism which is relevant to that issue, just so far the result must
be ill-considered, ill-balanced planning for the general good. It is
that mutilation of the thinking process against which [freedom of
speech and press] is directed. The principle of the freedom of speech
springs from the necessities of the program of self-government. 14
Freedom of speech has other justifications that are intertwined with
democracy. Freedom of speech is itself an end because the human com-
munity is in large measure defined through speech. Indeed, freedom of
speech is intrinsic to individual dignity. This is particularly important in
a democracy, in which the autonomy of each individual is accorded
equal and incommensurate respect. There is, however, more to the con-
cept of freedom of speech than individual dignity. Freedom of speech,
by fostering the values of democratic self-government, is thereby instru-
mental to the attainment of social ends. Again, the role of the press is
crucial to this goal.
As this discussion indicates, however, the role of freedom of speech
and freedom of the press has been severely restrained in many of the
nations undergoing a transition to democracy. Press autonomy has been
compromised by government and private actions, thus severely limiting
the scope, quantity and quality of the necessary information that reaches
the people. This lack of press autonomy and integrity is caused in large
part by such factors as market forces, government and private corpora-
tive coercion, tyranny, severe legal constraints, and historical and cul-
tural barriers. Nevertheless, as the brave individual reporters, non-
governmental organizations, academics and democratic minded political
actors work to develop democratic states, a democratic hope may come
closer to a democratic reality, but only if the institutions of government
stringently protect freedom of expression and freedom of the press.
An absolutely crucial aspect of democracy and the creation of a
moral consciousness of humanity is an institutional structure that pro-
tects and encourages freedom of speech and freedom of the press. Cre-
114. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLrrIcAL FREEDOM 27 (1965) (emphasis in original).
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ating and preserving such a structure is one of the most difficult tasks
assigned to the judiciary and the citizenry of a democracy. The success
of such a venture remains uncertain. Indeed, in nations striving to
become democracies, the struggle continues on a daily basis.
A cantankerous press, an obstinate press, a ubiquitous press must
be suffered by those in authority in order to preserve the greater values
of freedom of expression and the people's right to know. In the final
analysis, it is not merely the opinion of the editorial broadcaster, the
writer or the columnist that is protected by freedom of speech and the
democratic structure. It is the free flow of information - the entire
communicative process - that must be protected so that the public will
be informed about the government and its actions, including the relation-
ship between private corporative power and government, and so that the
people can scrutinize government, hold it accountable, and protect their
sovereign prerogative. A vibrant, independent, democratically minded
judiciary must protect this structure. It can do no less if democracy is to
take hold. A true democracy requires no less from the judiciary.
V.
OLD PROBLEMS AND A NEW VISION OF THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY
Decades after the beginning of the "era of democracy," it is clear
that the struggle of these transitional nations for internal security and
economic, social, and political development - their attempts to create
the conditions for democracy to bloom - will continue to be a tortuous
one. Unsettled political conditions, weak management of the economy,
pervasive corruption, failed institutions, electoral crises, and sometimes
gross inequality in resource allocation leading to grinding poverty
underscore how poorly the international democratic revolution has
succeeded.
While many of these problems and the legacy of their history can
only be overcome by the people of these nations, help from the interna-
tional community is essential. But only the correct international incen-
tives directed at the real problems will lead to a viable, sound
democratic revolution. So far, these incentives have not been properly
employed. Each of the nations I have either mentioned or discussed in
varying depth - Argentina, Chile and Haiti - is an example of these
problems.
The deepest roots of these nations' problems lie not simply, or even
most significantly, in the particular country's politics or cultural history.
Institutional reforms of the type championed by the international com-
munity - such as total privatization of state owned industries or "judi-
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cial reform" -simply will not work until the more serious problems are
confronted. While the moral turpitude of many of the elites and
corporativist forces is real, the major political problems of these nations
lie in their social and economic organization. Unless and until these
difficult issues are addressed, there is little hope for positive change or
true democratic reform for the millions of people trapped in despair and
destitution. If these issues are addressed, however, it is possible that
positive changes in the political sphere will follow. The major hope
these nations have for achieving a valid democracy is the creation of a
new socioeconomic arrangement, which will be difficult to create and
even harder to maintain. But the absence of material deprivation is a
prerequisite for the conditions necessary to create a viable democracy.
What steps must be taken to achieve this goal?
1 15
An energized, vital democracy is much more than a nation that
holds periodic elections. Democracy requires an environment of secur-
ity that will allow people to maximize their liberty so they can follow
their dreams, pursue their preferred professions and try to fulfill their
personal desires. It requires freedom of thought and action so one can
explore a range of ideas and move about freely while doing so. Democ-
racy also means, among other things, the full development of a diverse,
rich civil society and the building and development of a creative institu-
tional structure that will assure the rule of law and justice. The hope is
that these developments will encourage political and social participation.
Only a strong state can provide these incentives. While these choices -
and democracy is always a choice - cannot necessarily be imposed by
the international community, they certainly can be encouraged by it.
While many nations are reaching out for democracy, what are the
policy choices for changing the political economy? The overriding char-
acteristic of the political life and discourse of nations in the transition
process has been a frustrated desire to escape the choice between a
nationalist-populist project and a neoliberal project. The rejection of
these alternatives, and of dictatorship, has a deeper meaning than is tra-
ditionally understood. It is a revulsion against a feigned public life,
which is in fact little more than a weapon or disguise of private interests.
This problem is not unique to Argentina, Chile or Haiti. It is reflected in
the institutional structures of many developing nations. The dominant
regimes of the less developed economies, and even their critics, often
start with the desire merely to imitate and import the institutional
arrangements of the rich industrial democracies. They do this in the
hope that from similar institutional devices, similar economic and politi-




cal development will result. But such imitation has not led to the
desired results. The failure of these efforts at emulation may neverthe-
less be useful to the development of new and experimental institutional
structures, which may shed light on the suppressed opportunities for
transformation to democracy. But many of these nations in the transi-
tion process have not yet started on this experimental path.
The import-substituting protectionist style of industrialization and
the pseudo-Keynesian public finance of a nationalist-populist approach
are unable to deal with the huge problems facing these nations. Latin
America, for example, still faces some of the problems and after-effects
caused by hyperinflation and stagnation created by irrational closed
economies and massive public spending. Neoliberalism (neoliberal-
ismo), the single-minded pursuit of foreign investment and its accompa-
nying austerity and inequality, is equally unable to service the real
conditions of sustained economic growth.
Neoliberalism's rise to the status of religious doctrine is largely due
to the influence of the United States, particularly in regulating and con-
trolling the conduct of international monetary and trade organizations.
The Reagan Administration pushed the Latin Americans into pro-busi-
ness austerity programs and set the tone for a worldwide reduction of
government rule. Neoliberalism's acceptance is also due to the policies
of the World Bank and the IMF and to the wealth of its corporative
backers in a region where money matters above all else in politics. Nev-
ertheless, globalization has not had the desired consequences.' 16
Joseph Stiglitz, the 2001 Nobel laureate in economics and formerly
the chief economist of the World Bank, in his new book, Globalization
and Its Discontents, convincingly argues that by promoting private
enterprise wherever it can, the IMF was following the so-called Wash-
ington Consensus view of economic development, which sees the expan-
sion of free-market capitalism as the route to prosperity.' 17 With the
backing of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the IMF urged govern-
ments everywhere, especially those in the transition to democracy, to
privatize, liberalize and retrench. In the past twenty-five years, most of
the developing countries in the transition to democracy have followed
116. Both Joseph Stiglitz and George Soros, in their recently published books, argue that
globalization has failed. See GEORGE SOROS, ON GLOBALIZATION (2002); JOSEPH STIGLITz,
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DiscoNTrNrs (2002). Stiglitz, in particular, argues that the benefits of
globalization have been less than its advocates claim and the price paid has been greater. He
argues convincingly that the environment has been destroyed, political processes have been
corrupted, democracies undermined, and cultures eroded. Moreover, globalization has made
millions of people worse off, particularly as their jobs are destroyed and their lives made
increasingly insecure.
117. See S-nGLrr-z, supra note 116, at 16.
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this advice, dismantling their public-sector enterprises and opening up
their economies to world trade and investment. 1 8 As a result, the world
has become more interconnected than ever, with the level of exports,
imports and cross-border investment all increasing sharply.
According to classic economic theory, the expansion of trade and
commerce should have made humanity much better off. Ever since
Adam Smith, economists have generally agreed that trade is a good
thing, because it allows countries to specialize in what they do best.
This "division of labor" (Smith's phrase) raises productivity, which
results in more income to spend on food, health, education and con-
sumer goods. Although some people lose their jobs as the pattern of
trade changes, the winners gain enough to compensate the losers and
still have some left over for themselves.
During the 1970s and 1980s, when countries such as South Korea
and Singapore were exporting their way out of poverty, the theory
seemed to be working as advertised. Globalization claimed to improve
lives - the standard of living - of millions of people. Since 1990, how-
ever, the number of people living in extreme poverty - on less than two
dollars a day - has risen by more than 100 million to 3 billion.1 19 The
gap between rich and poor countries has turned into a chasm. Even
relatively prosperous parts of the world, such as Southern Asia and East-
ern Europe, and relatively prosperous nations, such as Argentina, have
fallen into unprecedented slumps.' 20 Stiglitz argues that neoliberalism
(including "globalization") is simply not working for many of the
world's poor, for much of the environment, and for the stability of the
global economy. 121
Why not? What went wrong? According to Stiglitz, the rich coun-
tries have hijacked globalization, using as weapons the IMF, the World
Trade Organization and other international bodies that are supposed to
act in the interests of all countries.122 These institutions are all too often
closely aligned with the commercial and financial interests of those in
the advanced industrial countries,1 23 Stiglitz argues, and the net effect of
the policies they promote is to benefit the few at the expense of the
many, the well-off at the expense of the poor.124 The governments of
the rich countries have pushed developing democratic-minded nations to
open their borders to computers and banking services but have continued
118. See id. at 53-73.
119. See id. at 253 n.2.
120. See O'Donnell, supra note 23.
121. See STILrrz, supra note 116, at 214.
122. See id. at 206-13.
123. See id. at 216.
124. See id. at 209.
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to protect their own farmers and textile workers from the cheap food and
clothing that poor countries produce. The rich countries have supported
the extension of patent agreements that guarantee high profits for West-
ern pharmaceutical companies while depriving African countries of the
drugs they need to fight an AIDS epidemic. Stiglitz claims that those
critics who accuse Western industrialized democracies of hypocrisy are
right.
Moreover, the "shock therapy" aspect of economic reform champi-
oned by neoliberalist doctrine - freeing prices, hawking state-owned
enterprises to private investors at a discount (privatizing), and trying to
maintain a strong currency - is now seen as bad policy. Indeed, there
is now a consensus among economists that it is a mistake to create a
market economy without first developing the institutions necessary for
capitalism (and democracy?) to function properly, such as enforceable
laws, a working tax system, a modern legal system and a social safety
net. Almost every expert now agrees there is no shortcut to building a
modern economy.
It appears that there is no disputing Stiglitz's and George Soros' s 12 5
central point that globalization has outgrown its institutional framework.
Both authors suggest reforms that might help remedy the situation.
Most significantly, they advocate restructuring the international institu-
tions, so they are more democratic and effective. 2 6 For example, the
IMF's voting structure makes no sense - the Netherlands has about as
many votes as China. Stiglitz also recommends improving banking
supervision, changing the international bankruptcy laws, reducing the
number of IMF bailouts,127 and increasing the amount of aid and debt
relief that developing countries receive, especially those in Africa. 28
Soros believes that international aid should be increased 29 and that the
World Trade Organization ought to take greater account of issues like
workers' rights, health and safety, and the environment. 30
Whatever the merits of these suggested reforms, there is more than
125. See SOROS, supra note 116.
126. See SoROs, supra note 116, at 14-16; STICLrrz, supra note 116, at 250-51.
127. See STIGLrrz, supra note 116, at 236-40.
128. See id. at 243-44.
129. See SoROs, supra note 116, at 57.
130. Although Soros states that the WTO should make changes in response to these problems,
he also recognizes that the WTO by itself is in no position to solve them.
The WTO is not qualified to deal with environmental protection, food safety, human
rights, and labor rights except insofar as international trade is involved. Although
some changes could and should be introduced to make the WTO more cognizant of
these issues, the main remedy lies in states, particularly the United States, giving
equal support to other international arrangements.
Id. at 36.
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enough blame to go around. The governments of these developing
democracies have clearly made bad policy choices, which have done at
least as much as the IMF to keep poor people poor. In addition, the
difficulties the IMF faces in trying to help a country whose stock market
and currency are both plummeting are monumental and should not be
underestimated. But the international community is largely to blame for
exacerbating the economic, social and political problems of many of
these nations. 13
What is clearly needed now is somehow to fix neoliberalism's
major flaw -that it does not help the vast poverty-stricken majority live
a dignified life. Instead, corporative power creates wealth for a small
minority, while almost enslaving the majority. Unlike neoliberalism's
claim that government should play a minor role in the economy, real
democratic change requires the government to play an important and
dynamic role. At a minimum, the international community must
encourage these governments to pursue locally designed policies to draw
the poor into the global economy. To achieve even this minimal goal,
these governments must be given incentives to pursue a vision of a polit-
ical economy that is quite different than the image traditionally sug-
gested. Moreover, the judiciary has an important, if somewhat limited,
role to play in this process.
In political economy terms, promising alternatives that will allow
for a flowering of democracy might develop in some of the seriously or
marginally underdeveloped nations such as Haiti or Argentina in a vari-
ety of experimental directions. Each of these experiments must be con-
tinuously monitored so they can be changed as they unfold to meet the
requisite goals of democratization. This method is one of the few ways
that a positive transformation may take place in many of these develop-
ing nations. Flexibility is a necessary key to success.
Moreover, what we may be able to say and do about the future
possibilities of democratization depends crucially on our interpretation
of contemporary political, social and economic history. The radical
change many of these nations are making from inward oriented statist
growth is still in full swing.'32 Macroeconomic policy makers still wres-
131. Free market reforms have had one or two successes in Latin America. Chile is repeatedly
cited as such a success. Much of the rest of the continent, however, has still to make up for the
last decade of growth following the allegedly "successful" IMF bailouts of the 1980s.
Unfortunately, in addition to very low growth rates, many of these nations have persistently high
rates of unemployment -at double digits in Argentina since 1990 - even as inflation has
declined. The collapse in Argentina in 2001 is one of the most recent of a series of failures over
the past several years. Moreover, given the high unemployment rate for almost seven years, it is
amazing that the Argentine citizens did not riot sooner but instead suffered quietly.
132. Unfortunately, some nations, Argentina in particular, have been on the verge of full-scale
economic, social and political failure.
[Vol. 58:201
THE INDISPENSABLE STATE
tie with price instability and proper exchange rate regimes. External
threats and internal mistakes only prolong the transition and generate
uncertainties that exacerbate the problems. Simultaneously,
microeconomic changes, technical leaps and innovations, the legal
evolution of firms, and the use and disbursement of property rights are
still more in flux than fixed on the eve of new cycles of growth or
retraction.
At first blush, it may appear that Latin America's and perhaps
Haiti's relationship to the world economy leaves these nations and their
region with relatively few options. But I believe that options do exist.
Although we understand large-scale transitions imperfectly, what we do
know is that decisions made while institutions and partnerships are
being created and forged have significant - indeed enormous - subse-
quent effects. Thus the conjuncture of deep structural transformation
means that what these nations do now will shape what they can do later.
It is not just the structures, but also the rules that will shape them, that
are changing. 133
Three major areas of concern are evident in the social, political and
economic spheres. The first involves money. Macroeconomic instabil-
ity is a major force in undermining the ability of people, rich and poor
alike, to save and invest for the long term view. International sources
may help, but, without local savings or investment, they often leave
these nations exposed to forces over which they have the least control.
The second area of concern is the legal structure girding ownership
and use of property rights. Reform of corporate law and the emergence
of a new regulatory regime (paradigm) may help private parties to seize
upon new property rights to create new enterprises and new industries.
In both of these areas, the liberalization of the market is the factor that
should give the single biggest boost to long-term growth. Increasing
growth, however, is not the same as sustaining it. In both of these areas,
rule making and enforcement will certainly become the cornerstones for
growth.
The third concern is the approach to human capital. Both the long-
term view and long-term progress will be shaped by human skills and
aptitudes. In Latin America, for example, the educational systems are
impoverished. Good, sound education is scarce and increasingly hard to
find. It is, therefore, expensive and unequally distributed. If it is true, as
many claim, that education yields increasing returns, this is clearly a
matter of urgency for these nations.
These three areas of concern do not necessarily add up to an indict-
133. See, e.g., Lucien Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in
Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999).
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ment of the state in Latin America and Haiti. Rather, they are best seen
as an injunction that the state perform its role as a state, with public
duties and public authority. Indeed, there are public goods - sound cur-
rency, security, the rule of law, and education for which the state has an
overwhelming, indeed incomparable comparative advantage. Long-term
growth in this region may well depend on governments' abilities to
appreciate and exploit their own mandates and resources. An active
state is essential to the success of such democratic reforms. Courts, of
course, have to play major roles in this grand experiment.
If governments are to play this major role, what steps can they
take? First, as I have already suggested, it is important that these nations
take macroeconomic stabilization very seriously. One way of doing this
is through a dramatic rise in, and focusing of, the tax rate, which would
impose on both the privileged classes and regions of these nations the
costs of public investment in people and in infrastructure. It would be
utterly unrealistic for these nations to take another approach and con-
ceive of a sound financial system as one based on a drastic lowering of
governmental expenditure rather than on a raising and rationalization of
taxes. There needs to be a strong preference for a universal, direct con-
sumption-based tax - taxing, in a steeply progressive way, the differ-
ence between income and savings - as the means to finance the state
while promoting capital formation and productive investment. Coun-
tries like Argentina and Haiti will need large amounts of international
aid over a long period to augment these taxings, because these nations
are in financial crisis. But this aid must not be based on the same
schemes that have harmed their economies and helped lead these nations
into their present predicaments.
Second, there must be a push to train the poor majority in a variety
of skills needed in the global economy. Simultaneously, the state must
help create the conditions for an "anti-dualist" political economy. These
democratically minded governments have to attack aggressively and
overcome the internal division of these nations into two (or more) econ-
omies that are only tentatively and hierarchically connected. What is
needed is the consolidation and development of a technologically skilled
group of people in both the public and private sectors, and the use of this
group to lift up and transform the immense, backward second economy.
This approach would also suggest attempting joint public-private owner-
ship of enterprises and encouraging decentralized capital allocation and
management. These two or more economies cannot be allowed to
become the platform for an antiquated fordist-style industry that is una-
ble to compete abroad except through internal wage repression and that
is incapable of transforming the second economy. For example, net-
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works of small and medium-sized enterprises represent the most
dynamic forces in many of the economies of the developing nations and
are even paralleled by external experiments in the large businesses with
the greatest potential for growth and innovation. These intimations of an
alternative, less conforming industrial future - changing the organiza-
tion of firms, perhaps by making them more democratic, as well as the
character of regional economies within the country - need to be devel-
oped by a deliberate economic program, sometimes with the determined
help of the international community. Indeed, the international commu-
nity must play a central role in this experiment through monetary and
technical assistance, including training people in highly technical skills.
Third, if the breakdown of corporative control of the economy is to
succeed, the strict requirements of capitalism must be imposed on the
so-called free market capitalists through the privatization of the private
sector. Because market forces tend to concentrate wealth and power, a
democratically minded government must ensure that no barriers exist to
participation in the market. Indeed, the more players in the market, the
less concentration of wealth and power. Otherwise, there is the omni-
present risk of the dominant player whose power may skew the debate or
the policy toward his own self-serving ends, which may not be demo-
cratically optimal ones. Therefore, the government must control monop-
oly, encourage business formation, and even compete to counteract the
power of the dominant big-business actors. In addition, the activist state
must protect local businesses from the overwhelming power of interna-
tional influences. Local voices remain unheard when powerful external
forces control the media, the economy or the political sphere.
There are, of course, many positive aspects to a private market. If
the economy is successfully privatized, this will mean real competition,
real refusal of the capitalization of profits through the socialization of
losses, real antitrust, real markets in corporate control, real constraints
on nepotism and inheritance, and real private responsibility for the costs
of public investment necessary to meet some of these goals. Such a
capitalist regime requires parliament to pass laws, and the executive and
the courts to enforce them, opening the market so everyone can compete
on a somewhat level playing field.
These governments also must develop a parallel set of institutions
to compete in the marketplace. Public companies should be created and
developed to compete with the private ones. Moreover, these govern-
ments must impose on these public companies the requirements of seri-
ous and decisive competition and independent financial responsibility.
Total privatization of publicly owned companies is not necessarily a
good idea.
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The last part of the plan is educational. There must be a massive
investment in people and infrastructure, financed by taxes on the people
with the goods - those who possess the wealth. There must be a prior-
ity of such claims on the budget, backed by procedural devices with
executory force. In addition, preventive public health, sanitation and
food supplementation need to be given preference over therapeutic
medicine. Even more important for democratic change is the fact that
the people must be educated. Free public schools must be open to eve-
ryone, and literacy programs created and developed. There must also be
a shift of the control of education away from the memorization of facts
and towards an emphasis upon the mastery of generic practical and con-
ceptual capabilities.
In the organization of government, politics and civil society, the
alternative to nationalist-populist or neoliberalist projects may take the
form of a public-law counterpart to the political economy I have just
outlined, animated by the same concerns and moving toward the same
goals. Experiments should be attempted in these areas as well. For
example, structural reforms require at least two sets of institutional inno-
vations. First, a merger of the electoral characteristics of presidential
regimes is needed, posing a periodic threat to oligarchic control of politi-
cal power. There must be a facility for rapid resolution of impasse
through priority accorded to programmatic legislation, liberal resort to
plebiscites and referenda, and perhaps the vesting of power in both the
legislative and executive branches of government to provoke anticipated
elections in the face of impasses over the direction any particular coun-
try should take. Second, measures must be taken to heighten the level
and to broaden the scope of political mobilization in society, especially
through the strengthening of the political parties, public financing of
political campaigns, increased free access to television and radio, and
the breakup of any broadcasting cartel. Direct democracy must be
encouraged at all levels of society.
The macropolitics of institutional change must be complemented
by a micropolitics confronting the logic of habitual social interactions.
The typical elements of this logic include a predominance of patron-
client relations, with their pervasive mingling in the same associations
and encounters of exchange, power and sentimental allegiance. There is
frequently an oscillation between rule formalism and personal favorit-
ism, and each creates the opportunity and need for the other. There is
also a stark contrast between the treatment of "insiders" and "outsiders,"
and the consequent shortage of impersonal respect and reliability.
A democratic system must be capable of challenging and changing
both the established arrangements of the economy and the polity, and the
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intimate habits of sociability. In this task, those who yearn for democ-
racy must combine a strategic approach to the satisfaction of recognized
material interests with the visionary invocation of a reordered society.
In nations striving for democracy that are trapped in these impoverished
visions and systems, nothing is more important than encouraging the
belief in the people that structural change is possible. The governments
of these nations and the international community must encourage such
beliefs and actions. The state must be an active one in all of the demo-
cratic senses I have discussed. The judiciary's role is essential to the
task.
VI.
SOME NECESSARY JUDICIAL CHARACTERISTICS FOR THE
PERFORMANCE OF ITS DEMOCRATIC ROLE
In my discussion concerning the transition from dictatorship to
democracy, I have made several major points about the courts. To begin
with, I claim that the judiciary has an important, if somewhat limited,
role to play in this process and in the new democratic regimes. In partic-
ular, I argue that the judiciary must be vigilant in protecting freedom of
speech and freedom of the press. It also must play a major role in the
creative, transformative process of helping to shape a new vision of a
political economy. There is a caveat to offer, however. To meet its
democratic burdens, the independence of the judiciary must be
assured.'3 4 At the same time, however, it cannot be too independent in
the context of a democratic regime. Moreover, the courts have to
develop and engage in a constitutional adjudicative process, where
rational discussion, dialogue and argument rule.
Judicial independence is a term that is generally used to character-
ize the relationship of the judiciary to other institutions or agencies. An
independent judge is one who is not under the control or influence of
someone else. In a broad sense, there are three types of judicial inde-
pendence. One type requires the judge to be independent from the par-
ties in the litigation. A judge cannot be related to the parties or under
their influence or control. The theory is that the judge must be com-
pletely impartial. The extreme example of a violation of this impartial-
ity is a bribe or perhaps a social or political bias by the judge in favor of
or against one of the parties.
A second form of judicial independence concerns the collegial rela-
tionships or power of one judge over another. In the usual common law
134. See ELIN SKAAR, JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES IN ARGENTINA
AND CHILE, (Chr. Michelsen Institute, Working Paper No. 15, 2001), available at http://www.cmi.
no/public/2001/wp2001 -15.htn.
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system, the doctrine of stare decisis binds judges. Control, in both com-
mon and civil law countries, also is exercised through the regular appel-
late procedures. These forms of control do not generally threaten the
independence necessary to perform the proper judicial function.
Another form of judicial control outside of the normal appellate proce-
dure may, however, threaten judicial independence. These are bureau-
cratic controls in which one group of judges acting through an outside
organization may review the work of an individual judge and discipline
him. Such bureaucratic controls are commonplace in civil law countries,
where the judiciary is professionalized. There are also such controls in
some common law countries.13 5
A third form of independence, sometimes referred to as "structural
independence" or "political insularity,"1 36 is independence from other
governmental institutions - from the executive and legislative
branches. This political insularity allows the judiciary to act as a coun-
tervailing force within the broader governmental system. But too much
independence may be harmful to a democracy. A judiciary that is insu-
lated from popularly controlled institutions of government may interfere
with the actions or decisions of the legislative and executive branches
and therefore frustrate the will of the people. This can be a threat to a
democracy.1 37 In this sense of the term, judicial independence in a via-
ble democracy may require that we optimize and not maximize judicial
independence.138
135. See, e.g., The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980
§ 3, 28 U.S.C. § 372 (2000).
136. Elin Skaar lists four factors that are key indicators of structural independence:
appointment procedures, length of tenure; judicial councils; and the power of judicial review.
Moreover, she argues convincingly that Argentine courts have recently become more independent
because of constitutional reforms, alterations in the perceived military threat, and renewed vigor
by the human rights sector, and that this new independence has led to increased judicial activism
in human rights cases against the military. While I am convinced by her arguments to some
degree, they fail to explain the persistent corruption of Argentine courts. See SKAAR, supra note
134.
Indeed, another serious problem with courts playing a democratic role in checking the
executive is the politicization of the courts. Argentina, clearly a nation with a mature
infrastructure and set of institutions, presents a striking example of the failure of the independent
judiciary to check executive branch abuses, to help inculcate the importance of the rule of law in
the minds and hearts of the people, and thus to promote democracy. Argentina, to some extent, is
an example of the corruption of the judiciary by the executive it is meant to check. The judicial
actions in investigating the 1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires and the 1994
bombing of the Argentine Israelite Mutual Aid Association are sad tales of this corruption. For a
thorough discussion of these cases, see Memorandum on Argentina, the Judiciary, Corruption, and
Terrorism, from Gabriel G. Goldberg to Irwin P. Stotzky (Oct. 1, 2002) (on file with author).
137. See Sutil, supra note 68; SKAAR, supra note 134.
138. See Owen M. Fiss, The Right Degree ofIndependence, in TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN
LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 55 (Irwin P. Stotzky ed., 1993). Simultaneously,
the judiciary must be strong enough to be able to say no to the other branches of government if
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A second factor, besides independence, that is essential in helping
the courts meet their democratic burdens is the creation and develop-
ment of a constitutional adjudicative tradition. This requirement stems
from the most significant role the judiciary plays in a democracy - the
protection of human rights. Indeed, the recognition and protection of
human rights is the single most significant aspect of social life in a dem-
ocratic society. It is an instrument - a tool - that should help nations
avoid social catastrophes.
There is a caveat, however. Even when human rights are legally
recognized, as they now are in many nations undergoing the transition
process, that recognition does not ensure their protection. Those who
have a monopoly on coercion - corporative forces, such as powerful
executive officials, military officials, and the economic elite - may
employ the state machinery to carry out the most brutal violations of
rights. There are, of course, international agreements and other mecha-
nisms that put pressure on these forces to help secure these rights. But
that is only of limited help.
What is needed is the creation of a constitutional adjudicative tradi-
tion - a tradition that helps to create a moral consciousness in the citi-
zenry.13 9 This is where the judicial role is most crucial as a positive,
democratic force. Perhaps the best example of such a tradition is in the
United States. There, the establishment of a constitutional adjudicative
tradition has clearly helped protect human rights. The process estab-
lishes methods of rational discourse that have helped create a moral con-
sciousness in the citizenry and thus a barrier against abuses of human
rights by the government. In large part, this method demonstrates that
the function of the judiciary is to give meaning and application to consti-
tutional values independent of political preferences. Adjudication on
constitutional questions is the social process by which judges give
meaning to our values. 4' The process creates a dialogue between the
courts and society. It helps define and shape the protective contours of
these values. In the United States, the process, including remedies such
as injunctive relief, has led to structural reform of public schools, pris-
their policies adversely affect democracy, and to enforce its decisions. Courts must not
themselves become captured by corporatist or other external forces.
139. See, e.g., Irwin P. Stotzky, The Tradition of Constitutional Adjudication, in TRANSITION
TO DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 347 (Irwin P. Stotzky ed.,
1993).
140. In constitutional democratic nations, there is always a tension between constitutionalism
and democracy. These tensions operate when the strengthening of the constitutional ideal
restrains the democratic process and when the expanded power of democracy weakens
constitutionalism. For an intriguing analysis of the two concepts, see CARLos S. NINO, THE
CONSTrTUION OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (1996).
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ons, mental hospitals, and even housing authorities. 4 ' Indeed, the qual-
ity of social life in the United States depends crucially on this process.
Many nations involved in the transition process, particularly Latin
American nations, have failed to develop this type of constitutional adju-
dicative tradition. In many of these nations, the institutional structures
and practices needed to establish and perpetuate this tradition simply do
not exist. Institutional instability is often caused by the large degree of
dependence of the highest courts on the political process, 4 2 by the rapid
changes in doctrine, and by the regular wholesale replacement of
judges. 143
The development of such a tradition, however, does not necessarily
mean that human rights will be secured. Even in the United States, the
process has not always been carried out with the sensitivity needed to
protect such rights or indeed the democratic process itself.' Moreover,
the methods of adjudication developed in the United States do not neces-
sarily fit neatly into the cultures of developing democracies. Distinctive
legal cultures, different constitutional histories and theories, and differ-
ent visions of the role of and rule of law in each nation play a major role
in defining and shaping methods of adjudication. Moreover, such a tra-
dition cannot develop in a vacuum. The independence, reliability and
efficiency of the judicial process must be strengthened simultaneously
with changes in the economic, social and political spheres. But, if done
correctly, the establishment of such a tradition in these nations attempt-
ing the transition to democracy can be very important in consolidating
and perpetuating the rule of law, in protecting human rights, and ulti-
mately in developing and protecting the democratic process itself.
CONCLUSION
Authoritarianism and its remnants cannot be overcome merely
because people favor democratic methods for resolving almost insoluble
problems and developing a democratic nation. Powerful economic,
social and political forces block the passage from dictatorship to democ-
racy. The underlying forces include an almost organic conception of
society that leads to a dualistic vision of the social order, corporatism,
anomie and unlawfulness, and extreme concentrations of institutional,
141. See, e.g., OWEN M. Fiss, THE LAW AS IT COULD BE (2002).
142. See Goldberg, supra note 136.
143. See generally TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE
JUDICIARY (Irwin P. Stotzky ed., 1993).
144. See DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2d ed.
2002); LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, A YEAR OF Loss: REEXAMINING CIVIL
LIBERTIES SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, (2002); Memorandum on The U.S.A. Patriot Act, from Alice E.
Meyer to Irwin P. Stotzky (Oct. 13, 2002) (on file with author).
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economic and social power. A combination of these forces and the
interplay among them are often directly related to massive human rights
abuses committed by those who possess the power. In addition, the doc-
trines of neoliberalism and globalization, and their implementation, have
exacerbated many of these problems.
Central to the resolution of these issues and the operation of a
democracy is the need to develop and consolidate the institutional struc-
tures of government - an independent judiciary, a representative con-
gressional branch, and limitations on the executive branch. The rule of
law and the guarantees of due process must become an accepted, basic
requirement of public and private life. This means that the people of
these nations must internalize the importance and legitimacy of a consti-
tutional system based on the rule of law. They must also internalize
universal standards of achievement and competition necessary to the
proper functioning of a democracy. The belief in the overpowering sig-
nificance of status and connections, which severely cripples the transi-
tion to democracy, must be defeated.
In the long run, nothing positive can be achieved in these nations
without the establishment of a deliberative democracy - one that
allows for equal participation and rational discourse among all segments
of society. This discourse, in turn, is essential for the creation of a moral
consciousness of humanity that recognizes the value of human rights and
abhors any notion that disregards them. Courts must play a role in this
deliberative process, and help society resolve some of its major eco-
nomic, political and social problems. The courts' role in this democratic
experiment, while important, is somewhat limited. Courts must protect
the processes of freedom of speech and press. Indeed, the law may
sometimes have to be used to liberate and equalize speech opportunities,
to protect critics of the government, and to see that those who physically
harm journalists are brought to justice.
In addition, the political economy must be transformed, and courts
also have a role to play in this transformation. This includes the ability
to interpret and enforce a constitutional system. The function of a judge
in a constitutional democracy is to give meaning and application to con-
stitutional values, independent of political preferences. Indeed, the right
of the judge to speak and the obligation of others, like governmental
agencies, to listen depend not on the judge's personal attributes, nor
even on the content of his message. Instead, what is crucial is his ability
to be both detached and distant from the particular contestants and the
body politic itself. Simultaneously, a judge must be fully attentive to
claims and grievances, and fully responsive in ways that transcend pref-
erences and that are sufficient to support judgments determined to be
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constitutional. Thus, the legitimacy of a judicial decision depends criti-
cally on the quality of the process itself.
In the past three decades of democratic transition, the judiciary has
had rather limited success in promoting democratic reform. As I have
argued, democratic change cannot be created in a vacuum. This position
parallels Fiss's suggestion that an activist state is necessary to a devel-
oped democracy. In this article, I have extended Fiss's notion of the
significance of an activist state, and argued that it is even more impor-
tant to a developing democracy. What this means, of course, is that all
parts of the public and private sectors must work together on these over-
whelming problems. So far, this has not happened. But the promise and
the hope for real democratic reform remain in the hearts and minds of
the vast majority of the people in these nations. The activist state, par-
ticularly an activist judiciary, by living up to its democratic demands,
must keep these hopes alive and help them become a reality.
